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ABSTRACT 
 The need to proliferate intelligence to all appropriate levels of society is an 
imperative that has been all to vividly illustrated by the attacks of 9-11. Terrorism 
cuts across all levels of society through loss of life, economic chaos and inhibiting 
freedoms. The horrific loss of life cannot be minimized or discounted, but the 
damage goes further and its effects are enduring. Estimates of the future 
economic impact of terrorism, based on 9-11 losses, range from 100 million to 
100 billion dollars per year. These numbers don’t quantify the emotional toll or the 
self-imposed loss of personal freedom that attacks the very nature of democracy. 
The prolific nature of terror calls for an equally prolific response. This thesis has 
argued that in order to proliferate the intelligence, that will connect the dots and 
mitigate future terror attacks, all aspects of the intelligence enterprise must 
leveraged to form a collaborative intelligence community that includes federal, 
state and local law enforcement as well as private sector partners.  The policies 
and programs examined identify information sharing as the chief enabler of 
leverage. The premise is that the more information shared the more intelligence 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can intelligence policies and programs at all levels of 
government be leveraged in support of state, local and tribal 
stakeholders in order to enhance National Security? 
Maintaining and ensuring national security is the prime motivator for state 
action on the international stage. One method that states have traditionally used 
to ensure their security is deterrence. Deterrence is achieved through a proactive 
implementation of policies designed to keep non-citizens from violating the 
sovereignty of our Nation, thereby enabling national security. The arrival of 
terrorism on U.S. soil and its ensuing fatalities was a rude awakening. The 
asymmetrical nature of this new threat has raised some serious questions about 
the security of our borders. Security is achieved through a variety of means 
including physical and virtual barriers, and procedural and policy mitigations, all 
of which are supported by the nation’s intelligence apparatus. To that end, the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created in the wake of the 9-11 
attacks. The DHS mandates include the following: 
…Leading the unified national effort to secure America. It will 
prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond 
to threats and hazards to the nation. It will ensure safe and secure 
borders, welcome lawful immigrants and visitors, and promote the 
free-flow of commerce.1  
This is a tall order, and its level of efficacy will be largely influenced by the 
intelligence support rendered to state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies. 
Private sector partners will need to be engaged as well.  This thesis will examine 
how current and proposed polices and programs support the leveraging of 
 
 
                                            
1  Department of Homeland Security, “Preserving our Freedoms, Protecting America," 
http://www.dhs.gov/index.shtm (accessed 6/12/2008).  
 2
intelligence assets to support SLTP. The DHS is a logical choice to take the lead 
in the effort to engage SLTP stakeholders as a force multiplier in the battle for 
national security. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 2 recognizes that terrorists 
attempt entry into the United States in order to engage in acts of terror or criminal 
enterprise The President directed the formation of a foreign terrorist tracking task 
force with the following mission: 
To aggressively prevent aliens who engage in or support terrorist 
activity from entering the United States and to detain, prosecute, or 
deport any such aliens who are within the United States.2  
This task force was to be headed up by the Attorney General and included 
personnel from across federal law enforcement agencies and the intelligence 
community. Notably absent from this presidential directive is any explicit 
participation by SLTP stakeholders. Their sheer numbers when compared to the 
personnel assets available to the federal government underscores the 
importance of SLTP as equal partners. As of 2004, the Department of Justice 
reported 17,876 total state and local law enforcement agencies employing 
731,903 sworn officers.3 This number represents almost seven times the number 
of non-military federal employees with arrest powers. Furthermore, inclusion of 
first responders and private sector entities increases the number of potential 
partners by orders of magnitude. 
There are three interrelated areas impacted by the leveraging of 
intelligence assets. They are border security, criminal activity, and terrorism. The 
                                            
2  George W. Bush, "Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents," Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents 37, no. 44 (November 5, 2001,), 1561, 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2001_presidential_documents&docid
=pd05no01_txt-8.pdf (accessed 3/19/2008). 
3 Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Law Enforcement Statistics”,http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/lawenf.htm 
(accessed 9/17/2008, 2008). 
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southern border of the United States provides a snapshot of the magnitude of the 
problem. In 2005, 1,200,000 illegal aliens were captured crossing the southern 
border of the United States without proper authorization.4 The lions’ share were 
Mexican nationals, however, some 150,000 were other nationalities. U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) estimates it apprehends only one in four; 
this means that some 450,000 individuals, who were not Mexican, entered the 
country across our southern border in 2005. It is prudent to assume that they are 
not all here for acceptable reasons, such as seasonal employment or political 
asylum, and some may pose a threat to national security by engaging in unlawful 
activity. Proper leveraging of intelligence assets can be vital to help ascertain the 
identity and intentions of these individuals.  
Terrorism is at the forefront of American consciousness due to the events 
of 9-11, but there are other national security dilemmas that will remain, even if 
the terrorist threat is mitigated.  DHS’ Under Secretary for Intelligence, Charles 
Allen, has identified several of these additional areas of concern. He testified to 
the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk 
Assessment of the House Homeland Security Committee: 
The United States and its allies are engaged in a continuing, global 
struggle against a broad range of transnational threats.  Our 
nation’s communities face the threat of terrorism, of cross-border 
violence fomented by illicit narcotics trafficking and alien smuggling, 
and other threats apart from terrorism.5  
Secretary Allen was eluding to an illicit economy of crime and violence, 
that, were it a nations’ gross national product, would be the size of Spain.6 There 
is a positive relationship between crime and terrorism. Terrorism requires capital 
and infrastructure in order to be successful.  The capitalist nature and open 
                                            
4 Global Security, "US-Mexico Border Fence: Great Wall of Mexico," 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/systems/mexico-wall.htm (accessed 3/8/2008, 2008). 
5 Homeland Security, Statement of Assistant Secretary Charles E. Allen, 2007. 
6  Moises Naim, "The Five Wars of Globalization," Foreign Policy, no. 29, January (2003), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/Ning/archive/archive/134/5wars.qxd.pdf (accessed 6/12/2008). 
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society of the United States provides terrorists with the means to engage in the 
criminal acts necessary to underpin their sustainability.  The intermingling of 
crime and terrorism makes the methodology for fighting crime a feasible strategy 
for fighting terrorism. Therefore it is important that intelligence assets held at the 
federal level are used to support SLTP stakeholders, especially law enforcement 
with a direct interest in national defense. If the United States is going to enjoy a 
continued high standard of living, the paradigm must shift from federally provided 
national security to full and equal partnership with SLT law enforcement 
agencies. These agencies will become second or third tier assets without 
appropriate intelligence support. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis will answer how intelligence policies and programs at all levels 
of government can best be leveraged to support SLTP stakeholders in order to 
support national security. The engagement of all stakeholders in a collaborative 
intelligence enterprise is vital to national security; especially given the 9-11 
hijackers entered the country by largely legal means under the radar of traditional 
intelligence structures. The current state of border security and immigration 
policy allowed them slip through the cracks by marginalizing those most able to 
fill those cracks, SLTP entities. Methodologies for identifying potential terrorists 
and taking appropriate action without compromising the rights of citizens are 
problematic. The historical lack of focus on terrorism has resulted in an inability 
to effectively apprehend terrorists. There are arguments that the lack of terrorist 
attacks since 9-11 shows the salient value of current policy. This argument 
attempts to prove a negative. The unquantifiable nature of counter terrorism 
makes new policies a hard sell to a complacent public. In order to insure security, 
the civil sector must see the value of new programs, such as fusion centers, at 
the local level. One way to achieve this goal is through collaboration between 
intelligence and law enforcement. This country is well-versed in law enforcement 
techniques and has the pieces in place to conduct effective operations in both 
law enforcement and counter-terrorism arenas. If we can integrate federal  
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agencies and SLTP and enable them to focus on the nexus of crime and terror, 
then the chances of apprehending future terrorists before they act will increase. 
The ability to do this depends heavily on intelligence support. 
Intelligence support needs to cover a broad spectrum of interlocking 
pieces that make up the puzzle of national security. The brick and mortar pieces 
include fences and walls, such as a border fence in the San Diego region. A 
more robust barrier is under construction in San Diego pursuant to the secure 
fence act of 2006.7 The new fence will use technology to supplant the physical 
with the virtual in many areas. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), video 
surveillance, and motion sensors are only a few of the technological pieces that 
will require the input and support of intelligence agencies. Technology is not a 
panacea for national defense; instead it must be an enabler of human interaction. 
Interagency cooperation and a shift in intelligence culture must be addressed in 
order for any effort to be successful. The statutory constraints of checks and 
balances restrict the way that intelligence can be collected, analyzed and 
consumed by domestic agencies. The mitigation of cultural constraints must be 
addressed, along with funding and technology, if the DHS is going to succeed in 
its mandate. Leveraging intelligence support, by DHS to stakeholders, whether 
federal, state, local, tribal, or private sector will buttress national security and 
allow for a powerful projection of the nation’s policies at our borders.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The United States currently uses the approach of an active layered 
defense that is designed to defeat a potential enemy as far from our borders as 
possible. James Carafano sees some flaws with this system. The construct of 
interlocking layers, each backing up another, leads to an imperfect system filled 
with gaps, which can be exploited by those who would enter the nation illegally.  
                                            
7  "Secure Fence Act of 2006," http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_bills&docid=f:h6061enr.txt.pdf (accessed 6/12/2008). 
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He instead advocates a system of systems.8 The goal of this system would be 
the integration and modification of disparate methodologies and organizations to 
create symbiosis. This integration illustrates the need for structures where 
intelligence, law enforcement, and SLTP stakeholders can interact in meaningful 
ways.  The nature of the intelligence support provided by DHS to SLTP will be a 
critical factor in the development of this relationship. 
Magnus Ranstorp, a lecturer at the University of Saint Andrews and 
recognized Hezbollah expert, characterizes the new terrorist threat as one that 
both embraces technology and also uses the simplest means to defeat it. In his 
testimony to the 9-11 commission, he noted that: 
Despite our asymmetry in power projection both militarily and 
economically, the reality is that modern, high tech and complex 
societies can be brought to its knees by simple attacks against 
critical nodes that constitute their very strength…a main lesson of 
September 11th is that in an interdependent world, no one is 
invulnerable.9 
The notion that society can be brought to its knees by attacking critical 
nodes recognizes the networked nature of the nation’s critical infrastructure (CI). 
The networked structure of CI is not well served by the decentralized structure of 
American law enforcement. Ranstorp offered 10 areas of focus in order to form 
an effective counter terrorism strategy. Many of them relate directly to exploiting 
the nexus of crime, border security, and intelligence.  
Terrorists use false or stolen identities both to move unhindered from 
place to place and to secure financing. The average number of identities 
possessed by arrested al-Qaeda operatives is 16, coupled with a like number of 
                                            
8  James Carafano, "Safeguarding America's Sovereignty: A "System of Systems" Approach 
to Border Security," http://www.heritage.org/research/homelandsecurity/bg1898.cfm (accessed 
3/7/2008). 
9  National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Statement to the 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2003, 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/hearings/hearing1/witness_ranstorp.htm (accessed 6/12/2008). 
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credit cards.10 In addition to making them hard to detect, once apprehended, the 
investigation is delayed while trying to establish a real identity. Ranstrop 
advocates an intelligence-led approach to law enforcement before acts of terror 
or associated crimes can occur. Intelligence Led Policing (ILP) is a methodology 
that takes the everyday bits of information collected by local law enforcement and 
analyzes and integrates them into informative law enforcement intelligence 
reports. The bottom of line of ILP is analysis and dissemination. ILP will be 
discussed in depth later in this thesis. 
The states ability to improve the receipt, gathering, analysis, and sharing 
of travel intelligence data will be necessary to secure our borders. One current 
DHS program that addresses the need for traveler intelligence is U.S.-Visit. The 
US-Visit program is the centerpiece of the United States government’s efforts to 
transform our nation’s border management and immigration systems in a way 
that meets the needs and challenges of the 21st century.11 The program is 
designed to provide a layered approach to security by integrating the visa 
application, entry, and exit procedures into a process that shares information in 
order to facilitate national security. The U.S.-Visit program has been 
implemented in stages and remains incomplete. U.S.-Visit is an invaluable 
intelligence-gathering tool that enables us to identify those that overstay their 
visas and take appropriate action. The biometric aspect of the U.S.-Visit program 
provides the ability to verify that people are whom they say. This capability 
reduces fraud and makes terrorist watch lists all the more effective. U.S.-Visit 
entry procedures went “on line” in January 2004. By March of 2008, the entry 
program had screened over 112,000,000 people. This has resulted in some 3000 
                                            
10  National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Statement to the 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2003, 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/hearings/hearing1/witness_ranstorp.htm (accessed 6/12/2008). 
11  Department of Homeland Security, "US-VISIT Program," 
http://www.dhs.gov/xtrvlsec/programs/content_multi_image_0006.shtm (accessed 4/26/2008). 
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people being denied entry to the country.12 The private sector is a key partner in 
this program, as the onus for its final implementation has been placed on the air 
carriers themselves. One important way the DHS can leverage intelligence is to 
ensure the full implementation of the system and the dissemination of the data to 
law enforcement agencies.  
DHS has provided more than $380M to state and local 
governments…the department, along with other federal partners, 
has also dramatically improved the quantity and quality of analytical 
intelligence products that are provided to state and local 
governments.13  
The preceding is an excerpt from a DHS news release and appears to 
show that DHS support to SLTP is progressing at an acceptable rate. This is the 
case across the board. A 2006 survey of the 55 state homeland security directors 
found that more that half of the respondents were dissatisfied at some level with 
the specificity and actionable quality of the intelligence they received from the 
federal government.14 Two of the issues they cited were a lack of “tear line” 
intelligence products and a perception that policies and procedures were forced 
upon them without prior consultation or consent. In a related question, the 
inflexibility of DHS grant money was cited as major contributor to friction between 
the DHS and states. An unidentified survey respondent made the following 
comment, which was echoed by the overall results:  
The best action DHS could take to benefit the security of the 
state…would be to allow for more flexibility for expenditure of the 
Homeland Security grants.15  
                                            
12  Federal Register, "FR Doc E8-8956”, Volume73, Number 80,April 24, 2008, 
 http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/E8-8956.htm (accessed 5/9/2008). 
13  Department of Homeland Security, "DHS Strengthens Intel Sharing at State and Local 
Fusion Centers," news release, July 27, 2006, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0967.shtm (accessed 6/19/2008). 
14  NGA Center for Best Practices, "2006 State Homeland Security Directors Survey," 
http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0604HLSDIRSURVEY.pdf (accessed 6/19/2008). 
15  Ibid. 
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The survey seems to point to a need for greater interaction between DHS 
and SLTP officials, as well as funding support and attention to classification 
issues. It also suggests that funding for intelligence specific endeavors, such as 
additional intelligence analysts, could be an appropriate support response from 
the DHS to address the SLTP needs. 
The National Governors Association (NGA) issued its policy position (EC-
05) paper on Homeland Security in July of 2007. EC-05 addressed some specific 
intelligence issues and echoed the survey participants’ frustration with 
classification issues. Additionally, the NGA advocated federal intelligence liaisons 
in state fusion centers and called for expedited issuance of security clearances to 
SLTP personnel.16 The DHS is attuned to the needs of the states, and as of 
March 2008, there were 58 operational intelligence fusion centers in the United 
States receiving some sort of intelligence support from the DHS.17 This evolved 
recently with the fielding of DHS personnel to limited sites. As of March 2008, 
there were 23 intelligence officers assigned to fusion centers, with more in the 
pipeline.18 . The DHS sees four distinct benefits arising from fusion centers. 
These benefits are applicable to all stakeholders participating in the fusion 
process. They include clearly defined information gathering requirements, 
improved intelligence analysis and production capabilities, improved information 
and intelligence sharing, and improved prevention, protection, response and 
recovery capabilities19 
                                            
16  National Governors Association, "EC-05 Homeland Security Policy," July, 24, 2007, 
http://www.nga.org/portal/site/nga/menuitem.8358ec82f5b198d18a278110501010a0/?vgnextoid=
2a6a9e2f1b091010VgnVCM1000001a01010aRCRD&vgnextchannel=4b18f074f0d9ff00VgnVCM
1000001a01010aRCRD (accessed 6/19/2008). 2. 
17  Department of Homeland Security, "State and Local Fusion Centers," 
http://www.dhs.gov/xinfoshare/programs/gc_1156877184684.shtm (accessed 9/17/2008). 
18  Ibid. 
19  John Rollins, "Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress," Report for Congress 
(Congressional Research Service),http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL34070.pdf (accessed 
11/2/2008, 2008).  
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Despite integration efforts, the current state of intelligence support to law 
enforcement is like that of a vacuum. The perception is that the DHS and other 
federal agencies are sucking up information from the state, local and tribal 
government levels, while providing very little in return. The entire concept of 
homeland defense is an inductive, self-help construct. The vacuum analogy does 
not allow for two-way flow; nor does it encourage the lateral sharing of 
information.  
Movement across all axes in all directions will be required to solve issues 
as diverse as those presented by the whole of national security. In short, the 
system is stove piped when it needs to be networked. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
In order to identify shortcomings, it is necessary to establish a baseline 
from which to work. Once the baseline is established, gaps between what is 
official policy and the “ground truth” will be revealed. The nature of these gaps 
will be of paramount importance for the identification of solutions. To establish 
the ground truth, the nature of the Intelligence Community is explored; its 
evolution, or lack thereof since 9-11, and its interaction with SLTP is traced. The 
research will be accomplished via a thorough review and examination of 
pertinent policy documents. These documents will come from Congressional 
Research Service, the Department of Homeland Security and other official 
sources from across the IC. The polarizing nature of national security has made it 
a relevant topic for academics and journalists’ alike, so professional journals and 
popular media are sourced as well, in order to gain perspective from outside 
government circles. The study has little to no statistical component as the thesis 
deals primarily with policy issues whose metrics are hard to define. This thesis 
contains a study of federal strategies and how they affect SLTP and the state of 
national security. A case study consists of the perceptions of SLTP partners in 
the City of Anaheim, California. 
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The end result of this analysis is the identification of gaps pertaining to 
intelligence support. These gaps likely fall in three key areas: financial support, 
analysis and administrative issues such as classification and interagency 
coordination. The case study will serve as the baseline to evaluate current and 
proposed policies and programs and identify gaps. Once the gaps are identified, 
it is my intent to suggest ways that the DHS intelligence apparatus can best 
leverage support to SLTP law enforcement officials. The end result of this 
support should be the proliferation of intelligence that bolsters national security in 
a meaningful way. 
F. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
1. Setting the Table 
This chapter will “set the table” by covering the structure and history of the 
IC, the intelligence cycle, various statutory items such as the Patriot Act and 
IRTPA, and some barriers to leveraging intelligence. This background 
information is important for putting current intelligence related policies and 
programs into context. The concept of Intelligence Proliferation will be introduced 
as both an achievable goal and also an example of what the successful 
leveraging of intelligence will look like. 
2. Framing the Problem 
In order to identify the salient issues and the appropriate mitigations, the 
perceptions of SLTP stakeholders in California were gauged through surveys and 
individual interviews. The survey, conducted in 2005, consisted of respondents 
who were all law enforcement executives in California. The same respondents 
were polled again in 2007, and the results compared. In addition, personnel with 
the Anaheim California Homeland Security Battalion were interviewed in the fall 
of 2008. The results of this research served as a guideline for evaluating the 
efficacy of the policies detailed in this thesis. 
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3. Policies and Programs 
This chapter contains a review of pertinent policies and programs. The 
items reviewed represent some of the best available policy and program tools for 
the achievement of intelligence proliferation. It concludes by identifying the 
commonalities between plans and suggests where the DHS should focus its 
energies and resources. The two areas that show the most promise are 
Intelligence Led Policing (ILP) and Fusion centers, which will be covered in a 
subsequent chapter. 
4. The Promise of Proliferation 
ILP and Fusion Centers represent the greatest promise for the leverage of 
intelligence assets and the achievement of intelligence proliferation. They are 
discussed in terms of background, barriers, benefits, and points of entry for DHS 
support and how they promote intelligence proliferation and, by extension, 
national security. 
5. Backbrief 
Conclusions and final thoughts for the way forward are presented here. 
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II.  SETTING THE TABLE 
A. WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE PROLIFERATION 
The ultimate goal of the policies and procedures that will be examined in 
this thesis is intelligence proliferation (IP). Semantics are an important part of the 
discussion as the meanings of words change fundamentally with their 
employment. No single word in policy is as linguistically malleable as intelligence. 
Intelligence can be simultaneously used to refer to the Intelligence Community 
(IC) or the process used to derive strategic or tactical knowledge. The finished 
product disseminated in the intelligence process is often referred to by the same 
term.  Mark Lowenthal defines intelligence as it relates to information: 
Information is anything that can be known…Intelligence refers to 
information that meets the stated needs of policy makers and has 
been collected, processed and narrowed to meet those needs…all 
intelligence is information; not all information is intelligence.20 
Lowenthal’s definition constrains the use of intelligence to the purview of 
policy makers, and that is in fact the major theme of his book from which the 
definition is drawn. This is a valid view given the traditional purposes of 
intelligence, which are avoiding strategic surprise, providing continuity of 
expertise in a fluid political landscape, supporting the policy process and 
maintaining secrets. The shift from nation-state based threats to asymmetrical 
non-state actor based threats has facilitated a need for the habitual use of 
intelligence at the SLTP level, including law enforcement personnel, first 
responders, and in many cases private industry. At this level, in a very tactical 
sense, intelligence consumption becomes the purview of decision makers, not 
policy makers. The need for tactical intelligence at the first line of defense is 
more than simply the one way flow of information from SLTP to the federal 
government, and it is more than reciprocity back down the chain. True 
                                            
20  Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 3rd ed. (Washington DC: CQ 
Press, 2006), 6.  
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proliferation of intelligence lies in the omni-directional flow of information from all 
stakeholders, whether they are federal, state, local, tribal, first responder, or 
private industry. The disparate information must flow into the intelligence cycle 
and emerge as intelligence products for the consumption of all concerned. In 
order for this to happen, all stakeholders must be integrated into the intelligence 
process, not just as providers of raw data, but also as active participants. When 
everyone is involved as partners and the unique aspects and capabilities of each 
organization are leveraged for the common welfare and intelligence products are 
available for consumption by all, then we will have achieved intelligence 
proliferation. Intelligence proliferation is defined in this thesis as: 
INTELLIGENCE PROLIFERATION: A state of being, within the 
context of providing national defense, in which there is an omni-
directional flow of information in and finished intelligence products 
out of the intelligence process. These products will be tailored to 
the specific needs of the consumer and can be either strategic or 
tactical. This omni-directional flow embraces the traditional IC, 
state, local and tribal officials, law enforcement, first responders, 
and private industry.  
A discussion of the structure of the IC and how it currently interfaces with other 
levels of society is important in order to begin discerning how IP can be 
achieved. 
 B. THE STRUCTURE OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
The National Security Act of 1947 laid the foundations of the IC. Section II 
of the act provides the intent of the acts framers: 
In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a 
comprehensive program for the future security of the United States; 
to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and 
procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the 
Government relating to the national security…21 
                                            
21  United States Congress, "National Security Act of 1947," http://www.intelligence.gov/0-
natsecact_1947.shtml (accessed 9/5/2008). 
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Over time the membership and structure of the IC has evolved into the current 
structure of 16 primary members spanning 5 executive branch departments and 
the fundamentally independent Central Intelligence Agency. The oversight 
structure is rounded out by multiple funding streams and committees. This 
section will give a thumbnail sketch of the oversight, funding, and membership of 
the IC. An understanding of the sheer complexity of the IC structure is necessary 
if true efficiency is to be attained. 
1. Oversight 
The National Security Act of 1947 designated the Director Central 
Intelligence (DCI) as a dual-purpose post, which controlled not only the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) but also acted as oversight to the entire IC.22 The 
powers of the DCI were limited to the provision of guidance for budget 
preparation, the approval for the reprogramming funds across programs within 
the same department, and the transfer of funds and personnel between members 
of the IC.23 On paper these powers appear to be substantial; the reality is that 
procedures for the application of these powers effectively negated the authority 
of the DCI. Title I of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention act of 2004 
(IRTPA) established the position of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).24 
The new position of DNI relieved the DCI of the dual responsibilities held under 
the 1947 act. The DCI reverted to being solely responsible for the CIA and the 
DNI assumed oversight for the IC and primary briefing responsibilities for the 
President. The DNI gained a modicum of authority from the IRTPA through 
budgetary control of the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and the direct ear of 
the President with regard to the appointment of most IC members. 
                                            
22  United States Congress, "National Security Act of 1947," http://www.intelligence.gov/0-
natsecact_1947.shtml (accessed 9/5/2008). 
23  Ibid.  
24  108th US Congress, "Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004," 
http://www.nctc.gov/docs/pl108_458.pdf (accessed 9/5/2008). 
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Of the 16 members of the IC, 15 report not only to the DNI, but also to 
cabinet level officials. The one exception is the CIA. The entire IC, however, is 
subject to oversight from the executive and legislative branches of government. 
The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board is responsible for assessing 
the quality, quantity, and adequacy of intelligence collection, analysis, 
counterintelligence, and other activities of the IC.25  The President’s Intelligence 
Oversight Board conducts independent investigations as required and reviews 
the practices and procedures of the inspectors general and general counsels of 
the IC. The Office of Management and Budget is primarily responsible for 
reviewing budgets and vetting testimony based on the priorities and guidance of 
the President. 
The legislative branch oversight apparatus includes the US Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence (HPSCI). Other committees become involved as the activities of 
the IC members overlap into their areas of responsibility. The best example of 
this the House Armed Services Committee, which often is involved with 
intelligence oversight through the intelligence arms of its member services. 
2. Funding 
The funding of the IC comes from three primary sources. They are the 
National Intelligence Program (NIP), Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP), 
and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) program. The members 
of the IC often receive funds from multiple streams depending into which 
category a specific agency program falls. The NIP deals primarily with programs 
that are not of a specific military nature. Notable IC members in this category are 
the CIA and DHS. Their funding stream accounts for over 50% of the total 
budget. JMIP, which accounts for roughly 10% of the budget, is concerned with 
ventures that cross service boundaries. The important oversight conundrum here 
                                            
25  "United States Intelligence Community," http://www.intelligence.gov/1who.shtml 
(accessed 9/5/2008). 
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is that DNI can only exercise budgetary constraint over the NIP. This effectively 
gives the Army, Navy, Marines and Air Force a free hand as they fall under 
TIARA funds, which account for 30% of the intelligence budget.26 
3. Membership 
There are 16 members of the traditional IC. This thesis will argue in part 
that in order to achieve Information Proliferation, the IC must embrace SLTP 
stakeholders as partners in a networked intelligence enterprise. A list and brief 
description of the current members follows. 
National Security Agency (NSA): The NSA is widely regarded as the most 
powerful single member of the IC. Residing in the Department of Defense, NSA 
is the primary producer of signals intelligence (SIGINT) for the nation.27 
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO): The NRO also falls under the 
purview of the DOD, but is funded through NIP. They are responsible for building 
and maintaining reconnaissance satellites. The activities and even the existence 
of the NRO was classified until 1992.28 
National Geospatial-intelligence Agency (NGA): The NGA develops 
imagery and map-based intelligence (IMINT) solutions for U.S. national defense, 
homeland security and safety of navigation.29 
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA): Formed in 1961, the DIA is 
responsible for providing timely, objective, and cogent military intelligence to war  
 
                                            
26  William Lahneman, "The U.S. Intelligence Community," 
https://www.chds.us/coursefiles/NS4156/lectures/intel_us_intel_comm/player.html (accessed 
9/5/2008). 
27  National Security Agency, http://www.nsa.gov/about/ (accessed 9/5/2008). 
28  National Reconnaissance Office, " http://www.nro.gov/ (accessed 9/5/2008). 
29  National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, http://www1.nga.mil/Pages/Default.aspx 
(accessed 9/5/2008). 
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fighters, defense planners, and defense and national security policymakers.30 
They are 1 of 3 all source analysis agencies and take the lead in measurements 
intelligence (MASINT). 
State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR): The INR 
primarily supports the intelligence needs of the Department of State. They make 
sure that intelligence activities support foreign policy and national security 
objectives. They are the 2nd of three all source agencies.31 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI): The FBI has traditionally been a law 
enforcement agency with domestic responsibilities. The National Security Branch 
of the FBI was created, at the behest of the President, in 2005 to specifically 
counter the transnational terrorist threat.32 
Department of Energy (DOE): The DOE is responsible for three areas that 
have a direct link to intelligence.  They are in the business of insuring the integrity 
and safety of the country's nuclear weapons, promoting international nuclear 
safety and nuclear non-proliferation.33 
Department of Treasury: The Department of Treasury Office of Terrorism 
and Financial Intelligence is responsible for marshalling the Treasury 
Department’s policy, enforcement, regulatory, and intelligence functions in order 
to sever the lines of financial support to international terrorists, proliferators of 
weapons of mass destruction, narcotics traffickers, and other threats to our 
national security.34 
                                            
30  Defense Intelligence Agency, http://www.dia.mil/ (accessed 9/5/2008). 
31  Bureau of Intelligence and Research, http://www.state.gov/s/inr/ (accessed 9/5/2008). 
32  "Federal Bureau of Investigation Homepage," http://www.fbi.gov/ (accessed 9/5/2008). 
33  U.S. Department of Energy, “National Security," http://www.doe.gov/nationalsecurity/ 
(accessed 9/5/2008). 
34 Department of the Treasury, http://www.treasury.gov/ (accessed 9/5/2008). 
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Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA): The DEA is responsible for 
providing the IC with intelligence acquired while conducting its counter narcotics 
missions.35 
Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Special Operations Command: All of 
the services and the joint Special Operations command maintain organic 
intelligence capabilities which are tailored to their specific needs. Collectively 
they make up 5 members of the IC. 
Defense Airborne Systems was an organization within the DOD from 1993 
until 1998 when the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 1998 (H.R. 1775) 
canceled its funding. DARO dealt with the “air breathing” IMINT platforms such 
as unmanned aerial systems (UAS). The predator UAS, representative of their 
work, was transferred to the Air Force and other responsibilities absorbed by 
DIA.36 
The Coast Guard also maintains a robust intelligence capability that 
serves to support its border security and search and rescue missions. They are 
now a part of the Department of Homeland Security and will be considered as 
included during any discussion of DHS capabilities. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS): The DHS mission statement 
makes it clear that they are the lead agency for evaluating vulnerabilities and 
coordinating with other federal, state, local, and private entities to ensure the 
most effective response to all hazards of a national scope. The collection, 
protection, evaluation, and dissemination of information to the American public, 
state and local governments, and the private sector are central to this task.37 The 
mandate to get quality intelligence into the hands of homeland security 
stakeholders will form a core competency of the organization. 
                                            
35  Drug Enforcement Administration, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/index.htm (accessed 
9/5/2008). 
36  Lahneman, The U.S. Intelligence Community 
37 Department of Homeland Security, "Information Sharing & Analysis," 
http://www.dhs.gov/xinfoshare/ (accessed 9/5/2008). 
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4. Legislation 
The Patriot Act (H.R. 3162) was approved less than seven weeks after the 
attacks of 9-11. The speed at which the bill was written and passed suggests that 
many of the sections had been contemplated prior to 9-11. Many of the 
provisions were decried by organizations such as the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU). Laura Murphy, the director of the ACLU, sent a letter to the 
Senate urging them to vote down the legislation on the basis that the powers 
granted to the Executive Branch and federal law enforcement went beyond what 
was necessary to fight terrorism.38 Whether or not the bill was co-opted by 
opportunistic legislators for their own personal agendas will not be discussed in 
this thesis. What is important is that the compressed timeline and pre-positioned 
legislation resulted in a bill that was about more than terrorism and put some 
significant tools in the hands of law enforcement.  
On March 9, 2006, President George W. Bush revisited the Patriot Act 
when he signed H.R. 3199, USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 
2005. President Bush reiterated the importance of the nexus of crime and terror. 
Similarly he underscored the importance of interagency cooperation and 
intelligence sharing: 
The law allows our intelligence and law enforcement officials to 
continue to share information. It allows them to continue to use 
tools against terrorists that they used against -- that they use 
against drug dealers and other criminals. It will improve our nation's 
security while we safeguard the civil liberties of our people. The 
legislation strengthens the Justice Department so it can better 
detect and disrupt terrorist threats. And the bill gives law 
enforcement new tools to combat threats to our citizens from 
international terrorists to local drug dealers.39 
                                            
38  Laura W. Murphy, "American Civil Liberties Union: Letter to the Senate Urging Rejection 
on the Final Version of the USA PATRIOT Act," October, 23, 2001, 
http://www.aclu.org/natsec/emergpowers/14401leg20011023.html (accessed 10/1/2008). 
39  George W. Bush, "Comments upon Signing H.R. 3199, USA Patriot Improvement and 
Reauthorization Act of 2005," March, 9, 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/patriotact/ 
(accessed 10/1/2008). 
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If the nexus of crime and terror is a focal point for counterterrorism, then 
the nature of the IC must change. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) made several fundamental changes to facilitate 
the paradigm shift. As previously mentioned, the establishment of the DNI by 
Title I of the act was designed to more effectively integrate disparate agencies 
under a common chain of concern. IRTPA also mandated the Information 
Sharing Environment (ISE) that will be covered in detail later in this thesis. The 
act also established a civil liberties protection officer in order to insure that 
protections against the violations of rights are integrated into all policies and 
procedures.40  
The combination of these two relatively new pieces of legislation with 
existing laws forms the framework within which the IC must work to ensure 
intelligence proliferation. 
C. THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE 
Information is not intelligence. To become intelligence information must be 
processed. The classic intelligence production model is viewed as process with 
defined policies and procedures governing each step. There are some differing 
opinions as to the number of steps, but general agreement is between five and 
seven. I will examine the intelligence cycle as a seven-step process. The ideal 
outcomes of the process are targeted, actionable intelligence products. There is 
a positive relationship between the value of intelligence to a given user and the 
input that consumer had in the generation process. In order facilitate this positive 
relationship, SLTP stakeholders must be integrated into a process that has 
generally been the purview of professional federal agencies. A discussion of the 
intelligence cycle is needed to understand the points of entry that will be most 
useful to SLTP stakeholders. The seven steps are adopted from Lowenthal’s 
 
 
                                            
40 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 , Title I sec 1016, 1061   
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book, Intelligence: from Secrets to Policy. The steps, briefly described below, are 
the identification of requirements, collection, processing/exploitation, 
analysis/production, dissemination, consumption, and feedback.41  
1. Requirements 
The production of intelligence is resource intensive. Given that there are 
finite amounts of time, money, personnel and physical assets, stakeholders must 
make hard choices about exactly how these limited resources are to be 
expended for maximum return. The validity of a requirement is driven by the 
consequence of a given event. At the national level, the National Intelligence 
Priorities Framework (NIPF) adjudicates the debate between high probability low 
impact events and low probability high impact events. The NIPF receives a 
semiannual review in order to ensure the most urgent needs are being met, and 
it is used as a guide for the budget process.42 The local first responder is not 
concerned with what happens in a cave in Afghanistan. To make the SLTP 
stakeholders viable partners in national security, the intelligence provided needs 
to illustrate a direct nexus to their community. It is unrealistic to have 
representatives of every community in the United States occupying a desk at the 
National Operations Center. The specific needs of the local community need a 
place to interface with requirements generation. My research suggests that the 
appropriate venue for this discourse is at regional fusion centers.43 Fusion 
centers will be explored in detail in Chapter IV. 
2. Collection 
Once a requirement has been validated, the task of collecting information 
begins. Not every requirement is fulfilled in the same manner. This needs to be a 
capability-based process. The STLP stakeholder needs only to define the 
                                            
41  Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 54. 
42  Ibid., 58. 
43  Scott Berg, Personal interview by the author, 09/23/2008. 
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requirement and let the collection assets determine the best way to achieve it. 
There are five generally recognized types of intelligence that intuitively suggest 
how the information that generates them is to be collected, though the 
capabilities mentioned are only representative and in no way are all-inclusive. 
The first three are highly technical and expensive. Image Intelligence (IMINT) is 
just that - images. It has evolved from simple photographs to infrared and 
satellite imagery. Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) is the discipline that includes 
everything from intercepting phone conversations to the use of radar tracking. 
Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT) detects things such as 
radiation, important given issues of nuclear weapons proliferation and the 
emissions of gases into the atmosphere. A less technical method is Human 
Intelligence (HUMINT). This discipline involves what people view as the classic 
“007” type of espionage. The newest player on the scene is Open Source 
Intelligence (OSINT). In the past this meant reading the newspaper of your 
enemy. With the explosion of globalization and the Internet, OSINT has become 
one of the fastest growing and most prolific sources of information. The real input 
for SLTP stakeholders in collection lies in HUMINT, especially in the case of law 
enforcement, and OSINT. The other disciplines are still cost prohibitive for most 
entities below the federal level. DHS advocacy on the part of SLTP will essential 
for the achievement of IP. 
3. Processing and Exploitation 
This step takes the raw information collected and renders it into a useful 
product. There is tension between the collection aspect of the intelligence cycle 
and processing. For primarily economic reasons, technical collection systems 
receive priority when it comes to budget and oversight. The result is imbalances 
between what is collected and what is actually processed. The volume of 
information to be processed into intelligence is simply too large to handle. 
Providing the IC with specific requirements can help reduce the amount excess 
information impeding proper exploitation and processing. 
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4. Analysis and Production 
Analysts take the processed information and place it into the context of the 
requirement to produce an intelligence product. The ramifications of a particular 
piece of processed information can be different based on your perspective and/or 
responsibility. The difference between near and far fights or long versus short-
term outlooks points to the need for tailored analysis. This is an area where the 
DHS can provide support to STLP by providing funds for local analysts or training 
and increased access to processed information existing local analysts. Funding, 
training, and access were all cited as impediments to effective integration by the 
STLP stakeholders interviewed for this thesis. Their concerns will be expanded 
upon in subsequent chapters. 
5. Dissemination 
Dissemination of the completed intelligence product occurs in two places, 
both within and without the producing organization. The internal dissemination 
poses only minor issues. Interagency circulation and distribution outside the IC 
are a key factors leading to intelligence failure. Dissemination problems range 
from traditional stovepipes, classification (trust issues), and cultural attitudes. 
Dissemination issues have given rise to numerous programs to mandate the 
sharing of information. The Information Sharing Environment (ISE)44, as 
mandated by President Bush, is a key initiative in this area and will be discussed 
at length in this thesis. The sharing of information and ultimately intelligence is 
what underpins the national strategy for homeland defense. The DHS must work 
to break down dissemination barriers to support STLP stakeholders and make 
them equal partners in national defense. 
6. Consumption 
Consumption is nothing more than use of a particular intelligence product 
to support policy, strategic, or tactical goals. The ability of an agency to consume 
                                            
44  "Information Sharing Environment," http://www.ise.gov/ (accessed 10/3/2008). 
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intelligence is predicated on the timeliness and actionable nature of that 
intelligence. This goes back to properly defining requirements and disseminating 
them in manner that is useful. Barriers to consumption can include classification, 
sheer volume, or ignorance of what is available for consumption.45 The DHS can 
help SLTP stakeholders at this stage by providing a means to discover what is 
available. This will allow consumption to be tailored to specific needs. 
7. Feedback 
The feedback loop is a critical component of any effective system. 
Feedback can occur at point in the intelligence cycle, so long as it does occur. 
Members of the IC often lament that they have no feedback on which to base 
their actions.46 The DHS can play a critical role in acting as a liaison between 
SLTP stakeholders and the IC. 
The intelligence cycle is a constantly in a state of flux with multiple steps 
happening simultaneously. The rapidly changing inputs and outputs of the 
system make it critical that STLP stakeholders are integrated into the process so 
they are not left behind to the detriment of national security. 
D. BARRIERS 
Several classes of barriers to the effective leveraging of intelligence 
support are civil liberties concerns, administrative issues, resource scarcity and 
corporate culture. 
1. Civil Liberties 
Civil liberty concerns are paramount in a democratic society, and an 
inherent distrust of secrecy is part of the American cultural narrative. The real 
argument here is freedom versus security. Benjamin Franklin was quoted as 
saying 
                                            
45  Scott Berg, Personal Interview by the author, 9/23/2008. 
46  Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 64. 
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Anyone who trades liberty for security deserves neither liberty nor 
security.47 
These are strong sentiments, and they resonate both positively and 
negatively in American culture to such an extent that they will not be directly 
discussed in this thesis. The Thesis will instead focus on the areas where the 
DHS has a legitimate chance at effecting change. Following this line of thought, 
issues such as “posse comitatus” will not be addressed. 
2. Classification 
The classification of data is the number one impediment to intelligence 
proliferation. Even if all of the other barriers could be resolved, the inability to 
access the intelligence would still render it useless. A look at sensitive but 
unclassified information (SBU) gives us a snapshot of the problem.  A GAO 
review of federal agencies revealed that 56 separate designations were given to 
SBU information, and 16 of these resided in a single organization (Department of 
Energy).48 This is a single non-classified designation; when we add truly 
classified information to the mix, the waters become extremely muddy.  
The number of designations is problematic, but so is the lack of 
overarching standards that allows for this type of latitude. There also needs to be 
a standard for granting clearances and mandated reciprocity across agencies. 
Under the current system, a clearance issued by the FBI may not be considered 
valid by the DOD and vice versa. This issue was addressed in 1991 with National 
Security Directive 63. NSD 63 stated that  
Investigations satisfying the scope and standards specified above 
are transferable between agencies and shall be deemed to meet 
the investigative standards for access to collateral Top 
Secret/National Security Information and Sensitive Compartmented 
                                            
47  Benjamin Franklin, "Benjamin Franklin Quotes," 
http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/b/benjaminfr384732.html (accessed 10/3/2008). 
48  GAO, "GAO-06-385: The Federal Government Needs to Establish Policies and Processes 
for Sharing Terrorism-Related and Sensitive but Unclassified 
Information,"http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06385.pdf (accessed 8/21/2008). table 2. 
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Information. No further investigation or reinvestigation prior to 
revalidation every five years will be undertaken unless the agency 
has substantial information indicating that the transferring individual 
may not satisfy eligibility standards for clearance or the agency 
head determines in writing that to accept the investigation would 
not be in the national security interest of the United States.49 
In short, what is good for one agency should be good for another. Two 
more Executive Orders, 12968 and 13381, and the IRTPA have made significant 
headway, but shortcomings still remain. 
3. Administrative Issues 
Standardization of procedures and training of personnel are low cost ways 
to mitigate risk. Standardization gives the right hand confidence that the left is 
doing the correct thing and facilitates integration across all levels. 
Representatives Howard Berman and Bennie Thompson roundly criticized the 
Bush administration for failing to implement the recommendations of the 9-11 
commission. Some areas of failure are directly linked to DHS information sharing 
initiatives: 
Section 511 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53) mandates the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) to issue a concept of operations for DHS 
State, Local, and Regional Information Fusion Center Initiative.50 
The DHS failed to produce this document, and fusion centers continue to 
operate in an ad hoc fashion. This is their right as they are entities of the states 
or localities that formed them. However, the lack of standardization mandated 
makes it hard for the IC to integrate and achieve IP. 
 
                                            
49  George Bush, "NSD 63:  Single Scope Background Investigations," 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/nsd63.html (accessed 10/19/2008).   
50  Bennie Thompson and Howard Berman, Wasted Lessons of 9/11: How the Bush 
Administration has Ignored the Law and Squandered it's Opportunities to make our Country 
Safer,[2008]), http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/HR1AnniversaryReport.pdf. 23. 
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Funding for analysts has been undermined by the structure of the DHS 
grant process. The current structure of the funding system only allows grant 
money to fund hiring, training, and retention of new and existing intelligence 
analysts for three years. This is an improvement of the previous periods, when 
the cap was set at two years. Arbitrary funding caps and time limitations on the 
use of funds has forced some States and localities to fire analysts after three 
years just to continue qualifying for DHS funding.51 This exact problem has been 
cited as a significant roadblock in the city of Anaheim, CA and will be discussed 
in a later chapter. 
4. Culture 
The intelligence community was borne of the cold war, and as such its 
culture is one of secrecy, not only with respect to foreign governments but also 
across its own agencies and the tax paying constituency that funds it. This 
attitude is understandable given its historical context; however, understanding 
does not give way to advocating the broadcasting of secrets. That being said; 
there has to be a change in the mindset of the IC to facilitate national defense in 
a networked and globalized world. The solution then becomes the development 
of a corporate intelligence structure that nurtures an omni-directional flow of 
information embracing everyone whom has a legitimate stake in homeland 
defense.  J.M. McConnell, the Director of National Intelligence, summed these 
concepts up succinctly when he said: 
…We must challenge the status quo of “need-to-know” culture and 
move to one of a “responsibility-to-provide” mindset.52  
                                            
51 Bennie Thompson and Howard Berman, Wasted Lessons of 9/11: How the Bush 
Administration has Ignored the Law and Squandered it's Opportunities to make our Country 
Safer,[2008]), http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/HR1AnniversaryReport.pdf. 27  
52  Office of the DNI, United States Intelligence Community Information Sharing Strategy, 
(2008),  2. 
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E. SUMMARY 
This chapter has given a summary of the IC, how it works and some of the 
challenges faced when leveraging its assets to bolster the capabilities of SLTP 
stakeholders.  
• The idea of Intelligence Proliferation was introduced, as a label to 
identify what success will look like. IP should not be taken to 
suggest unfettered access to intelligence. The concept is that those 
at the STLP level, whom have been properly vetted, will become 
integrated and equal partners in National Defense. 
• The structure of the IC and its oversight regimes tends to “stove-
pipe” information. The addition of SLTP partners, underpinned by 
information sharing will lead to a more networked structure that will 
bolster National Security. 
• The traditional seven-step intelligence cycle can be an effective tool 
if the SLTP stakeholders can be integrated. I have suggested 
several areas that DHS can facilitate entry into this cycle by SLTP. 
The most important areas are in requirements generations and 
feedback. 
•  Areas that impede Intelligence Proliferation include classification, 
cultural and administrative issues.  
The ground truth of these barriers is best illustrated by the experiences of 
SLTP stakeholders in their day-to-day operations. In order to frame the problem 
at the SLTP level, Chapter III will explore the attitudes of police chiefs and 
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III. FRAMING THE PROBLEM: THE LOCAL PERSPECTIVE 
As previously discussed, The 9-11 Commission Report, states that a 
failure to connect the dots contributed to the success of the 9-11 attacks. The 
implication is that the Intelligence community was unable to marshal its 
considerable resources to properly protect the nation. This raises more questions 
than it answers, chief among them is whether or not intelligence could have 
predicted the plot and subsequently foiled it. If so, then what was the nature of 
the failure and how do you solve it? This thesis suggests that the failure of 
integration that contributed to 9-11 is symptomatic of a larger problem. The root 
cause of the failure was and, to some extent, still is the structure of the IC.  
A new environment of blurring borders and jurisdictional boundaries has 
called into question traditional roles and distinctions between domestic and 
foreign intelligence. The pre 9-11 IC was simply not adaptive enough to counter 
the asymmetrical threat that international terrorism posed. Vision 2015, the 
roadmap for the future of the IC as seen by the ODNI, states that: 
To respond effectively to the changing strategic landscape, we 
need structures, people and systems aligned to ensure a unified 
effort, ready to adapt with greater agility.53 
The solution lies in the leveraging of federal intelligence assets and the 
integration of local law enforcement along with their private sector partners. The 
leveraging process can be achieved by any number of means. These means are 
the policies and programs discussed in this thesis that will lead to Intelligence 
Proliferation. 
Which programs are appropriate for a given situation and how we know 
when an effective nexus of the IC and law enforcement communities has been 
achieved, will depend in large part on the attitudes and perceptions of the 
stakeholders, that is, do they perceive the value of the changes as worth the 
                                            
53  ODNI, "Vision 2015 Globally Networked Intelligence," http://www.dni.gov/Vision_2015.pdf 
(accessed 8/19/2008). 8. 
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expense. No group of stakeholders is going to agree 100% on a course of action 
or the efficacy of a resolution. This is due largely to the fact that any resolution 
can have effects beyond its original intent. In the case of the IC, any change in its 
complicated structure and the inclusion of new elements (SLTP stakeholders) is 
bound to have secondary and tertiary effects far in to the future.  The structure of 
the IC after 1947 did not serve the nation well post cold war. Changes made to 
the IC to function post 9-11, may protect us in the short term, but set us up for 
failure against some as of yet unknown future threat. Any measures taken to 
change the IC will leave a mark at some point in the future. Not knowing the 
extent or duration of these effects makes the integration of previously 
unconnected organizations an area of concern.   
A. SURVEY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT EXECUTIVES 
The development strategy for an IC/LE nexus is confounded not only by 
the shadow of the future, but also by the perceptions of the stakeholders. Prior to 
9-11, local law enforcement felt they didn’t receive enough intelligence. The 
federal government felt that in many cases they (law enforcement) didn’t have a 
need to know.  Patrick Miller, a career police officer, conducted a survey of over 
240 police chiefs and sheriffs in the state of California between 2004 and 2005. 
The results of his survey indicate that not much has changed since 2001. 
Miller asked a series of six questions about the current state of information 
and intelligence sharing at the local level. He categorized the responses into four 
groups based on the relative size of the departments. Figure 1 (below) illustrates 
the responses from group two (departments with 100-500 sworn officers). I have 
chosen this group because it corresponds roughly to the size of the departments 
in Anaheim, California. Anaheim was the focus of interviews conducted along the 
same lines. Miller concluded, based on the survey of all four groups, that: 
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…Across the board, local law enforcement agencies feel that there 
is inadequate information sharing and resources available to 
accomplish the homeland security mission.54 
The survey was not all bad news; some distinct patterns emerged that point to a 
promising future, if the momentum for change can be sustained. The largest 
departments had the most favorable responses. By and large they felt that the 
training, technological enablers (in the form of databases), and access to daily 
intelligence briefs was adequate. The question of fusion center participation was 
embraced in an overall positive manner with over 92% of the respondents 
expressing interest.55 The fall off in satisfaction seemed to have a causal 
relationship with decreasing size of departments. Intuitively this points to a need 
for targeted resource allocation to smaller departments, especially in the area of 












Figure 1.   Responses to Interview Questions, Group 2. This group consisted of 
45 departments.56 
 
                                            
54  Patrick Miller, "How can we Improve Information Sharing among Local Law Enforcement 
Agencies?" (MA National Security Studies, Naval Postgraduate School), 46. 
55  Ibid., 46. 
56  Patrick Miller, "How can we Improve Information Sharing among Local Law Enforcement 
Agencies?" (MA National Security Studies, Naval Postgraduate School), 44.  
 34
Miller conducted a follow up with the 2005 survey respondents in 2007. The data 
showed a dramatic increase in the level of satisfaction across all sizes of 
departments except those with less than 50 sworn officers. In the case of group 
two departments, the perception of the adequacy of intelligence sharing doubled 
to 48%. The average of all departments in this category was 22% in 2005; the 
increase to 51% constitutes a statistically significant increase.57 Clearly there is 
still work, but the results reinforce the patterns identified in the first survey. The 
one area that still shows a need for improvement is that of resource allocation. In 
2007 there was still an 87% dissatisfaction rate with the amount of resources 
available to execute the intelligence-gathering portion of the homeland security 
mission.58 
B. ANAHEIM CALIFORNIA 
Miller’s 2005 data reflected the evolution of perception amongst local law 
enforcement since 9-11. In order to gauge the continuity of that thought since 
2005, and perhaps gain some insight into the ground truth of integration gaps, 
the interaction of the IC, law enforcement and first responders was explored in 
Anaheim California. In September 2008, several sit down interviews were 
conducted with representatives from Anaheim Fire and Police Departments. No 
federal representatives were available; however their lack of input makes the 
data more congruent with Miller’s findings for comparative purposes. The 
following is a summary of the responses. 
The first thing that is striking about the city of Anaheim is that they have a 
Homeland Security Battalion Chief on their organizational chart. What is even 
more interesting is that a professional fire fighter, Tim O’Hara, fills the position. 
This is not illuminating on the federal level, but it shows significant integration on 
the local levels. The city of Anaheim has broken down some significant cultural 
                                            
57  Patrick Miller, "The View of Law Enforcement Leaders in California: A Comparison of 
Perspectives between 2005 and 2007" (power point presentation of survey data, 2008). 
58  Patrick Miller, "The View of Law Enforcement Leaders in California: A Comparison of 
Perspectives between 2005 and 2007" (power point presentation of survey data, 2008). 
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barriers between fire and law enforcement and placed personnel in a joint 
command. This represents a change in paradigm over a relatively short period. 
The Anaheim Homeland Security Battalion (AHSB) did not even contain a 
reference to the fire department in 2002. In terms of integration with the law 
enforcement and the federal government the hierarchy was clear. The federal 
government was “assisted” by law enforcement, and fire was relegated to 
“cooperating” with both entities as directed. In 2006 there was finally integration 
of police and fire.59 Chief O’Hara credited personal relationships at the executive 
level with breaking down the cultural barriers but he concedes that there is still 
work to be done: 
We still see pushback from the police, especially in the Terrorism 
Liaison Officer Program (TLO). At a recent training attended by 
over 100 people, I was the only fire officer; they asked why I was 
even there.60 
The TLO program illustrates an integrated training opportunity for local 
entities. A successful graduate of the program will be able to use the exploratory 
techniques of Intelligence Led Policing to act as a conduit for the proliferation of 
terrorism information. In 2007 there were 50 TLOs in Orange County, and there 
has been an increase to 187 in 2008. Of this number, 11 are firefighters, and 40 
more firefighters are slated for training next year.61 There is discussion of the 
inclusion of private sector partners in the program. Critical infrastructure 
operators such as Disney are prime candidates due to their unique threat 
environment. Currently the intelligence analysts at Disney meet monthly with 
intelligence working groups in Anaheim.62 The inclusion of private sector partners 
 
 
                                            
59 Tim O’Hara, Personal Interview by the author, September 15, 2008. 
60 Tim O’Hara, Personal Interview by the author, September 15, 2008. 
61 Jeff Van Der Sluys Veer, Personal Interview by the author, September 19, 2008. 
62 Scott Berg, Personal Interview by the author, September 23, 2008. 
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in training opportunities is an important avenue for integration and intelligence 
proliferation. The expansion in size and scope of the TLO program suggests that 
training is happening and barriers are being removed. 
The AHSB is well versed in the use of available data systems. They find 
the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) particularly useful. 
Embedded in this system is a fire service intelligence exchange and emergency 
preparedness links that facilitate their use of intelligence. All parties interviewed 
also pass and receive information via the California Joint Regional Exchange 
System (CAL JRIES), tripwire, and the National Operations Center (NOC). The 
major complaint is the lack of access to secret data. The problem is 
characterized as two-fold, the lack of clearances and portals. The AHSB is 
located at a satellite office of the Anaheim police department. As of 2008 this 
building has no capacity for secret data portals. Currently the only secure portals 
are available at the Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center (LAJRIC). 
Timeliness of data is compromised by the average commute time of 1:30 
minutes, one way, to access secret data. To date this has been more of an 
annoyance than operational problem, but it represents an information-sharing 
barrier that can be easily mitigated. The current systems are only functional if 
people are aware of them and use them. The experience of “stumbling” upon 
useful systems has caused frustration.. Chief O’Hara found the systems he uses 
by accident or word of mouth. This sentiment was echoed in other interviews. 
What is needed is a “menu” of available systems and their associated 
capabilities.63 This would allow for specificity of information retrieval and efficient 
allocation of resources. The research suggests that some potentially helpful 
systems may be underutilized for no other reason than lack of publicity. The 
information sharing environment, as envisioned by its framers, will need to find 
ways to penetrate more deeply into the consciousness of SLTP stakeholders. 
                                            
63 Scott Berg, Personal Interview by the author, September 23, 2008. 
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Anaheim is still experiencing problems with the reciprocity of security 
clearances. Most of the AHSB have clearances issued by DHS. The DHS 
clearance is not well received by the local FBI or, in some cases, by local law 
enforcement who discriminate against fire. This problem may be more cultural 
than a case of policy. Chief O’Hara is the homeland security battalion chief for 
Anaheim. This fact is well known, and he is accorded due courtesy.  Problems 
often arise at the LA JRIC. He recounted several experiences when his 
credentials were questioned because of his fire uniform. In one case he was 
denied access to secret data by the FBI, even after his clearance (from DHS) 
was validated. This was cleared up relatively quickly, but not without hurt feelings 
and harsh words.64 
Fusion center participation is robust in Anaheim. They have personnel at 
the Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center (OCIAC) and the LA JRIC. 
The OCIAC has a local focus and serves as a collection and processing point for 
information gathered using the exploratory techniques of intelligence led policing. 
The OCIAC was formerly the Terrorism Early Warning Group; the reason for the 
change was not conveyed. The current organization is based on a fusion center 
model that is inclusive of law enforcement, fire, health, and the private sector, 
and it has adopted an all-hazards approach. The goal of the center is to improve 
interagency coordination, protect critical infrastructure, and analyze intelligence. 
The organization also serves as the primary disseminator of daily intelligence 
briefs.65 The main difference between the OCIAC and other fusion centers is 
their ability and willingness to engage in “light surveillance.”66 Since 2003 the 
number of tips and leads the center has processed has increased from 111 per 
year to an average of 342. The LA JRIC serves the region and is where the 
interface with federal agencies takes place. The individual departments who 
detail their people to the centers, fund the participation. They would all like to do 
                                            
64  Tim O’Hara, Personal Interview by the author, September 15, 2008. 
65  Jeff Van Der Sluys Veer, Personal Interview by the author, September 19, 2008. 
66  Ibid. 
 38
more, but funding is an issue. The three-year funding cap on analysts imposed 
by the DHS grant structure is an improvement over past systems. However, 
when the current grant cycle runs out, the local departments will not have the 
funding to retain them.67 
A related problem to funding is resources in general. Integration has costs 
beyond personnel that must be addressed. Equipment needs and more mundane 
expenses, such as rent, must be addressed. Anaheim does not feel that they 
have been asked what they want, and they have no way of knowing what is 
available. The current requirements are being driven by a grant system, based 
on regulation, which dictates what departments can have, as opposed to what 
they need. Bolstering response will require funding structures tailored to 
individual needs, not the conjecture of someone 2000 miles away.68 
The intelligence cycle is not currently being utilized as a model for 
generating intelligence in Anaheim. The people interviewed felt that the 
appropriate place for integration into the intelligence cycle was at regional rather 
than local fusion centers. The reasoning was that the OCIAC served the needs 
for specificity at the local level. They felt that federal level intelligence would be 
nothing but white noise at the local level, and the regional centers could act as 
the filters.  
C. SUMMARY 
The Miller data and the situation in Anaheim suggest that the attitudes of 
stakeholders are generally favorable regarding the cost benefit analysis of 
participation in information sharing. There are several roadblocks that must be 
addressed in order to integrate SLTP stakeholders with the federal government 
and achieve Intelligence Proliferation. 
                                            
67  Scott Berg, Personal Interview by the author, September 23, 2008. 
68  Scott Berg, Personal Interview by the author, September 23, 2008. 
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• There is perceived lack of resources. Resources take the form of 
funding, equipment and discoverability of data and programs to 
support intelligence integration. 
• Cultural barriers impede the free flow of information. 
• The value of the intelligence cycle is recognized, but not utilized to 
its full potential. The embracing of intelligence policing techniques 
across all levels will sustain a strong start for the fusion concept. 
• Security clearance issues, particularly reciprocity, inhibit information 
exchange. This barrier is more cultural than statutory and needs to 
be addressed by strong leadership. 
• Funding and grant structures do not fit local needs 
Chapter IV of this thesis outlines policies and programs designed to target these 
specific issues and identify some of the most promising for further exploration. 
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IV. POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 
Because there is no consensus on what integration looks like, there is no 
limit on the number or nature of possible courses of action to develop a nexus of 
intelligence and law enforcement. 
A. POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 
The globalized threat environment, brought to the forefront of U.S. 
consciousness by the attacks of 9-11, continues to grow and evolve at a pace 
that cannot be matched by a cold war intelligence structure. Asymmetry and 
networked structures enable our enemies to rapidly assimilate new technologies 
and procedures without bureaucratic hindrance. Terrorists are free to train, 
reconnoiter targets, share information, and disseminate their message with little 
constraint. In order to counter this threat, the United States needs to move with 
purpose towards leveraging all elements of national power, especially 
intelligence. All of the major federal stakeholders in homeland defense have 
prepared policies and programs that outline the way forward.  Many of these 
documents were prepared with the input of law enforcement agencies, such as 
the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). Some civilian agencies, 
such as the Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCCA), prepared their own. What 
follows is a brief discussion of some of these major programs. Intelligence Led 
Policing, intelligence fusion, and data classification issues are the concerns that 
are addressed most often and point towards Intelligence Proliferation. 
1. National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan 
In 2002, the IACP held a summit on criminal intelligence information 
sharing. This summit gave birth to the Global Justice Information Sharing 
Initiative Intelligence Working Group. (GIWG) The GIWG teamed with elements 
within the DOJ to produce the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan. 
(NCISP) The GWIG vision of what the plan should be included nine areas of 
focus. 
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• A model intelligence sharing plan 
• A mechanism to promote the intelligence-led policing 
• A blueprint for law enforcement administrators to follow 
• A model for intelligence process principles and policies 
• A plan that respects and protects individuals' privacy and civil rights 
• A technology architecture to provide secure, seamless system 
information sharing 
• A national model for intelligence training 
• A plan that leverages existing systems and allows flexibility for 
advancements 
• An outreach action plan to promote timely and credible intelligence 
sharing69 
The size of departments has a direct impact on the amount of resources 
available for implementation. Because seventy-five percent of police departments 
have less that twenty-four sworn officers,70 the 28 recommendations that grew 
from the nine vision areas were designed for maximum effectiveness regardless 
of size.  
Recommendation one of the NCISP addresses the disparity in size and 
resources of departments. It advocates minimum standards of compliance and 
training with respect to Intelligence Led Policing and intelligence functions.71 
Compliance requires capital expenditure. In order to strengthen homeland 




                                            
69  GIWG Committee, The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan Bureau of Justice 
Assistance,[2005]), http://it.ojp.gov/documents/NCISP_Plan.pdf. 10. 
70  Ibid. 
71  Ibid., 10. 
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in the areas of training and technological infrastructure. The fear is that without 
adequate funding, there will be a lack of implementation, and the country will 
remain at risk.72 
Intelligence is not the exclusive property of law enforcement or the IC. The 
non-exclusive nature of intelligence makes it critical that private sector partners 
are engaged in any process. To this end the plan recommends the establishment 
of regular communication and engagement with private sector critical 
infrastructure for the purposes of information exchange.73 Information exchange 
is hampered by the current classification system. Everyone recognizes the need 
to secure methods and sources; therefore the plan recommends technical means 
to expedite “tear line” products.74 Recommendation twenty-four of the plan 
expands this further by advocating many technical enablers of information 
sharing that will be addressed later in the thesis.75 If true sharing is going to 
occur, there is a level of trust that must be achieved across the spectrum of law 
enforcement and extended to include all appropriate stakeholders. The NCISP 
suggests extensive background checks for individuals with access to sensitive 
intelligence. These checks would include fingerprints and standard name records 
searches every three years.76 The level of investigation is less than that of 
traditional security clearance and is only a suggestion of minimum standards. 
The recommendations I have briefly described are by no means 
exhaustive of the entire plan. They do however give a snapshot of some of the 
early post 9-11 thought processes. The themes running through the NCISP will 
be repeated in subsequent efforts. 
                                            
72 GIWG Committee, The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan Bureau of Justice 
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73  Ibid., 13. 
74  Ibid., 17. 
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2. Law Enforcement Assistance and Partnership Strategy 
The staff of the House Committee on Homeland Security prepared the 
Law Enforcement Assistance and Partnership Strategy (LEAP). The drafters of 
the document proceeded based on the assumption that, within their jurisdictions, 
local law enforcement was uniquely qualified to identify and thwart abnormal 
activity, which could be a precursor to terrorist activity:  
Accordingly, providing police and sheriffs’ officers with the 
information and intelligence resources they need to make sense of 
what they encounter on the ground every day – and to share their 
observations and concerns with the federal Intelligence Community 
(IC) in response – would be a giant leap toward making the 
homeland more secure.77 
The committee believed that information was not being properly shared 
and offered seven steps to that end. The steps included establishing of a national 
center for intelligence led policing, funding overseas liaison programs, 
establishing border intelligence fusion centers and associated funding, creating 
sanitized, law enforcement friendly intelligence products, expediting security 
clearances, and tracking the progress of these initiatives over time. The next 
section will explore some of the common themes in detail. 
ILP is based on the premise that local police officers collect countless 
pieces of information that, if properly analyzed and aggregated, could be an 
invaluable intelligence tool. ILP has the dual benefit of serving not only counter 
terrorism, but also all crime mitigation. The committee believes that there are two 
major factors inhibiting the kind of ILP that supports national security. The first is 
the perception that intelligence is the purview of the federal government. The 
second is a lack of training and standards for the collection, consumption, and  
 
                                            
77  The Committee on Homeland Security, "Law Enforcement Assistance and Partnership 
Strategy," http://epic.org/privacy/fusion/leap.pdf (accessed 10/14/2008). 1. 
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privacy issues of intelligence.78 Intelligence analysts have a separate concern as 
articulated by Lisa Palmeiri of the International Association of Law Enforcement 
Intelligence Analysts: 
Intelligence analysts and officers disseminate too much raw 
information, creating an environment of white noise…Vital 
information is still not accessible to law enforcement analysts at the 
state and local levels…law enforcement officers and executives are 
not trained consumers of intelligence.79 
The LEAP strategy for the establishment of a National Center for ILP 
would address all of these concerns and problems. The particulars of these 
solutions will be investigated in a separate section on ILP contained in Chapter 
V. 
The United States has 216 airports, 143 seaports and 115 land border 
crossings that serve as official points of entry into the country.80 The federal 
agencies responsible for the ports of entry cannot be reasonably expected to 
catch everything. State and local law enforcement must be engaged to defend 
the spaces in between. The problem is a lack of technological interoperability and 
intelligence sharing. Everyone realizes that there is a problem, but the DHS has 
failed to develop a system of border intelligence sharing with its local partners. 
The lack of institutionalization has reduced the flow of information to a system 
based on personal relationships.81 The ebb and flow of these relationships is not 
an effective strategy for national defense and borders on hope. LEAP advocates 
border fusion centers and the funding for their establishment and sustainment.  
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These fusion centers will serve to close the gaps between our ports of entry. 
Fusion centers and the issues associated with them will be addressed in Chapter 
V. 
The Vertical Intelligence Terrorism Analysis Link (VITAL) is a program 
designed to mimic the United Kingdom’s Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC). 
The difference between JTAC and our National Counter Terrorism Center 
(NCTC) is the inclusion of local police via the Police International 
Counterterrorism Unit (PICTU). The PICTU gets the local under the same roof as 
the government operators and facilitates the flow of information and the break 
down of cultural barriers. VITAL would serve the same purpose at the NCTC. 
LEAP envisions detailed, properly cleared, local officers doing tours of duty at the 
NCTC. The locals could share their particular concerns about what affects them 
locally and work to convert classified documents to law enforcement friendly 
consumables.82 The adoption of the LEAP plan and its funding can go a long 
way towards integrating locals into the intelligence cycle. 
The flow of intelligence can be enhanced or blocked by the nature of ones 
security clearance. LEAP sees two overarching problems with the system of 
clearances in its current form, reciprocity and timeliness. The process of getting a 
clearance is backlogged, and in many cases it takes an inordinate amount of 
time to get a clearance complete. Once the process is complete many agencies 
don’t recognize the validity of another department’s clearance. For example the 
FBI doesn’t recognize a clearance issued by DHS without further investigation.83 
LEAP proposes a program called MUSCLE (Moving Urgent Security Clearances 
for Law Enforcement). This program calls for the standardization of clearances 
for the purpose of reciprocity and mandates a sixty to one hundred twenty day 
processing time, depending on the level of clearance required. 
                                            
82 The Committee on Homeland Security, "Law Enforcement Assistance and Partnership 
Strategy," http://epic.org/privacy/fusion/leap.pdf (accessed 10/14/2008). 22. 
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LEAP advocated funding overseas liaison officers and benchmarking 
processes to assess the current state of affairs. While foreign exchange may be 
of benefit to large metropolitan areas, this is an appropriate expenditure of funds 
given the size (less than 24 sworn officers) of most departments and 
jurisdictions. Research shows no evidence that the benchmarking 
process/survey suggested in 2006 has occurred or will ever occur.  Many of the 
other programs suggested by LEAP have made preliminary strides towards 
fruition with the introduction of S.3524, the Homeland Security and Law 
Enforcement Improvements Act of 2008. Senator Joe Biden of Delaware 
introduced the bill September 18, 2008. It has been referred to the House 
Committee on Homeland Security, the same committee that authored LEAP.  
3. Information Sharing Strategy 
On February 22, 2008, The Office of the Director National Intelligence 
(ODNI) issued the United States Intelligence Community Information Sharing 
Strategy. J.M. McConnell, the Director National Intelligence, summed up the 
goals of the strategy as follows: 
Together we must challenge the status quo of ‘need to know’ 
culture and move to one of a ‘responsibility to provide’ mindset. 
Implementing this strategy will enable intelligence entities to act as 
stewards of intelligence data and take advantage of every 
opportunity to share information that can improve the security of our 
Nation.84 
Much like “intelligence”, information sharing means different things based 
on relative positional perspective within the overall system. The ODNI strategy is 
predicated on their position at the top of the information sharing hierarchy. They 
define information sharing as: 
…Information sharing behavior is the act of exchanging intelligence 
information between collectors, analysts, and end users in order to  
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improve national and homeland security. Information providers 
must make information accessible, available and discoverable at 
the earliest point possible.85 
There are several key take-a-ways from this definition. The most important 
is the verbiage that makes information sharing an explicit behavior, not a passive 
phenomenon. Further this behavior occurs between individuals at all levels of the 
intelligence cycle. Therefore, the strategy defines itself as a behavior not a 
technology and is inclusive not exclusive. This way of framing the way forward 
should help break down the cultural impediments to intelligence proliferation. 
The strategy itself is broken down into four strategic goals and numerous 
linked strategic objectives. The goals articulate what should happen and the 
objectives identify the path to the desired final condition. Finally the 























Figure 2.   Strategic Goals86 
 
The goals were designed to be achievable and measurable without 
overstepping the bounds of realistic probability. The objectives associated with 
each goal attempt to clearly articulate ‘deliverables’ for each area, thus 
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establishing metrics for evaluation. Articulation of metrics is where the document 
loses momentum. For instance the third goal (Establish a common trust 
environment) contains five objectives. 
• Define a uniform structure and attributes to enable identity 
management and the guidance to support decentralized agency 
specific implementation. 
• Establish Identity management standards, to include authorization, 
authentication, auditing and cross-domain services. 
• Develop information security policies that support data protection 
efforts. 
• Create a common classification guide for the IC. 
• Establish an approach that manages risk, supports trust and 
protects sources and methods.87 
Each of these objectives depends on the development or establishment of 
new policy or is contingent upon implementation of the same. In short, any one of 
the objectives is a single point of failure for the entire enterprise. The objectives 
are attainable, but they will require more than legislation or the programming of 
new policies and procedures. They will require a shift in culture, and 
management cannot mandate a cultural shift. The question of implementation 
has been addressed by linkage to the 500-Day Plan for Integration and 
Collaboration. The plan outlines the deliberate ways the IC is moving towards 
transformation, and it is divided in six areas of focus. Figure 2 (below) shows how 
the strategic goals are linked to specific areas of the plan. 
                                            

























Figure 3.   Plan Linkages88 
 
The information sharing strategy and the 500-Day Plan are both products 
of the IC and designed at their core to address issues within the traditional IC. 
Initiatives One and Two of the 500-Day Plan (create a culture of collaboration 
and accelerate information sharing) contain clauses that speak directly to the 
engagement of non-federal partners. In order to address this direct linkage, the 
ODNI has established a steering committee to coordinate efforts with other 
information sharing initiatives. One of the initiatives alluded to in the 500-Day 
Plan is Vision 2015. 
4. Vision 2015 
The office of the Director National Intelligence published Vision 2015 in 
2008 to expound upon the intelligence enterprise first introduced in the National 
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Intelligence Strategy. It calls for a globally networked and integrated Intelligence 
Enterprise for the 21st century, based on the principles of integration, 
collaboration, and innovation.89 The document does not explicitly mention SLTP 
stakeholders as partners, but rather calls for the involvement of “numerous new 
partners.”90 The goal of the vision articulated in the document is decision 
advantage. Decision advantage is simply the leveraging of all available 
intelligence assets and partners to acquire and provide an informational edge 
and to deny our adversaries the same. The five facets of the plan are customer 
driven intelligence, global awareness and strategic foresight, mission focused 
operations, net centric information enterprise, and enterprise integration. 
Enterprise integration is the lever that will enable full partnership of SLTP 
stakeholders and facilitate intelligence proliferation. 
a. Enterprise Integration 
Vision 2015 requires a strong core foundation. This foundation is 
comprised of the vital elements of the intelligence enterprise: people, processes 
and technology. The organizations of the IC historically have had problems 
managing these areas: 
Organizational differences, competing cultures, non-interoperable 
systems, unclear decision rights and conflicting business rules 
acted as barriers to collaboration, greatly undermining our ability to 
adapt and reducing our organizational agility…we will need 
continued leadership and organizational commitment to truly 
integrate by 2015.91 
The ODNI continues to work towards the institutionalization of 
information sharing and has instituted an incentive structure that spans the 
entirety of the intelligence enterprise. A key change along these lines is the 
requirement of “joint” duty for promotion to senior executive levels within the six 
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departments under the purview of the DNI.92 The goal of this policy is to develop 
leaders who can rise above parochialism and build relationships that foster true 
collaboration. 
The transformation of security functions is a key component of 
integration. The enterprise will function on common security standards and 
practices that will be designed to support new partners. The new security 
environment will require some fundamental changes to the classification system. 
The trick will be simplification without compromise. 
The agility of infrastructure will also need to be addressed: 
By 2015, employees from different agencies will have to be 
collocated to more remote locations, away from centralized 
headquarters. The needs for cross-organizational collaboration, 
cross-functional teams and programs will require a more agile 
infrastructure.93 
The concept of agility to support collaboration suggests the type of 
arrangement seen in state fusion centers and the NCTC.  If true collaboration is 
to be achieved, mitigation of cultural, monetary, and bureaucratic frictions, as 
well as a lack of focus has to be addressed across all five facets of the plan. The 
first and foremost of these barriers is cultural. When it comes to implementation 
we: 
…Are challenging an operational model of this vision that worked, 
and proponents of that model will resist change on the basis that it 
is unnecessary, risky or faddish.94 
Once the cultural barriers are removed via strong transitional 
leadership, the forward progress of the vision will be able to move towards the 
resolution of the other issues. 
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 B. THE NATIONAL STRATEGY 
The preceding section has shown just a few of the numerous plans around 
the nation and across all levels of government.  The National Strategy for 
Information Sharing is the effort of the federal government to articulate and 
memorialize the full contours of disparate strategies into a single document.95 
The subtitle of the document is “Successes and Challenges in Improving 
Terrorism-Related Information Sharing”; this underscores the importance of 
information sharing as the centerpiece of national security. The plan outlines five 
foundational elements. Sharing amongst federal agencies, SLT entities, private 
sector, and foreign partners account for the first four. The fifth is the protection of 
privacy and other related legal rights. Foreign partners and legal issues are 
outside the scope of this project; the others will be discussed in turn. 
1. Information Sharing at the Federal Level 
There are five generally recognized communities within the federal 
government that are targeted by information sharing strategies. The IC, 
homeland security, law enforcement, defense, and foreign affairs will work within 
a framework established by the plan in order to achieve interagency cooperation. 
The cooperation at the federal level is a template to be applied at all other levels. 
The NCTC is of particular interest, as it deals specifically with intelligence and 
national defense. In theory all federal entities that acquire or posses terrorism 
related information would provide that information to the NCTC for analysis, 
processing and dissemination. The Interagency Threat Assessment and 
Coordination Group (ITACG) is responsible for sanitizing the intelligence for 
distribution outside the federal government. 
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2. Information Sharing with State, Local and Tribal Entities 
The primary mission of local law enforcement and first responders is not 
counter-terrorism. This emerging mission must be integrated into current 
responsibilities without overstretching resources and breaching the trust of their 
communities. These local concerns change the perspective from which the 
problem of national security, and support needed to achieve it, is viewed.. SLTP 
entities must develop a culture of fusion; this is an all crimes approach that 
includes the identification of a possible nexus of local crime and national security 
implications. There must also be situational awareness across all levels of 
government. SLTP must send information up the chain for analysis, and the IC 
must reciprocate. The key to this relationship is collaboration, the onus for 
advancing this collaboration lies with the federal government. The ITACG is a 
primary conduit for collaboration of ‘tear line’ products. These products however 
do not answer the need for clearances of SLTP. There is still a need for key 
stakeholders at the SLTP level to have access to the same raw data at their 
fusion centers in order to gain the advantage of the local perspective before 
further dissemination and data customization as deemed appropriate. It is the 
policy of the strategy to  
…Promote state and major urban area fusion centers to achieve a 
baseline level of capability and become interconnected with the 
Federal government and each other, thereby creating a national, 
integrated, network of fusion centers to enable the effective sharing 
of terrorism related information.96 
C. INFORMATION SHARING WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
The private sector is involved with national security primarily through its 
ownership of 85% of the critical infrastructure in the United States and its 
responsibility to protect it. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan outlines 
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specific ways the federal government interfaces with CI owners and operators. 
The NSIS supports the NIP by advocating the inclusion of CI into the intelligence 
cycle and the common operating picture as appropriate. 
D. SUMMARY 
There are several recurring themes in each of the plans presented.  
• There is a universally recognized need for the fusion of information 
at all levels of government. The appropriate venue for the 
aggregation of information and resources is the fusion center. 
• Collaboration implies a flow of information across all axes. The best 
facilitator of this flow is the movement to a networked organizational 
structure. 
•  First responders, be that police, fire, or rescue, are invaluable 
sources of terrorism information and mitigation. They must be 
supported through the leveraging of all assets of national power, 
especially timely, locally targeted, and actionable intelligence. 
•  The exploratory nature of Intelligence Led Policing makes it the 
construct for information gathering and shows the most promise for 
exploiting the nexus of crime, terrorism, and national defense. 
•  Implementation of any policy will have to overcome cultural 
barriers and build an environment of trust.  
 These common themes are addressed through ILP and fusion centers. In 
order to facilitate intelligence proliferation and national defense, ILP will 
gather the information, and fusion centers will act as the conduit between 
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V. IMPLEMENTAION OF PROLIFERATION 
Chapter IV identified areas of overlap that are common to all of the 
disparate strategies and programs. There is a universally recognized desire for 
intelligence fusion, a networked structure, the inclusion of first responders and 
private sector partners, the techniques of ILP as a facilitator of intelligence, and 
the breakdown of cultural barriers. The focal point for change comes from these 
areas of overlap. Large scale buy-in by all the stakeholders is made easier by the 
leverage of common concerns. Machiavelli in his book The Prince framed the 
difficulties of implementation as follows: 
There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of 
success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order 
of things.97 
The new order is the integration of STLP stakeholders, and the difficulty 
lies in the perception, bolstered by a cold war attitude, that intelligence is a close 
hold and secrecy is paramount. Because conventional wisdom was fraught with 
the distrust of people and agencies outside ones own, intelligence was 
dispensed on a strictly need to know basis. In order for Intelligence Proliferation 
to be successful, a shift in paradigm to a responsibility to provide will be 
necessary. The way to achieve this shift is by focusing on areas of agreement 
and designing implementation strategies that demonstrate the value and 
engender the trust of all stakeholders. With the inclusion of STLP stakeholders, 
the fundamental architecture of intelligence functions will change from “stove 
piped” to “networked”. This new, networked architecture will facilitate an 
Information Sharing Environment (ISE). The ISE underpins Intelligence Led 
Policing techniques, which will provide the exploratory information necessary for 
Fusion Centers. 
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A. UNDERPINNINGS 
1. Networked Approach 
Secretary Chertoff addressed the first annual National Fusion Center 
Conference in March 2007. His message was that the intent of the federal 
government was not to create a single fusion center controlled by the 
government, but rather: 
…A network of centers all across the country, a network which is 
visible not only to the federal level, but as important, if not more 
important visible to each of you working in your own communities 
so you can leverage all the information gathered across the country 
to help you carry out your very important objectives.98 
The network architecture of which Secretary Chertoff spoke is important 
and bears further discussion. The threat caused by terrorism is unlike any the 
United States has dealt with in the past. Our military and security apparatus is 
designed to counter threats posed by other nations. These traditional threats are 
above board and can be handled in a variety of ways, both with known 
counterparts and the backing of the international community. In short, national 
security occurs at the macro level. Intelligence structures and functions tend to 
be agency specific and focus on other states. Divination of secrets and the 
security of our own secrets create stovepipes that compartmentalize information.  
These informational stovepipes are a primary factor in intelligence failures. The 
al-Qaeda operatives who perpetrated the 9-11 attacks did not so much exploit 
these stovepipes as benefit post facto from their existence. The end result is the 
same and highlights deficiency in the current structure. We can look to our 
enemies to see the solution.  
An asymmetrical terrorist group uses a networked structure to operate 
unhindered at the micro level. The typical terrorist network is scale free as 
opposed to random. What this means is that the terror cells (groups) are fairly 
dense (well connected to each other). In this sense, the terrorist cell is much like 
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the stove piped architecture we are trying to mitigate. However, central 
individuals bridge the cells of a scale free network. This structure has two 
implications for counter-terrorism and by extension Intelligence Proliferation. 
First, attacking the cell itself will not disrupt the entire network; in fact destroying 
an individual terrorist cell will have little overall effect on the network as a whole. 
The disruption of scale free networks requires attacking the few well-connected 
individuals who form the bridges and hold the network together. For example, the 
well-connected nodes in a random network are connected to an average 27% of 
all other nodes within the network. The connection rate in a scale free network of 
the same size is almost 60%.99 The reason terror networks are effective is the 
connectivity and resilience evidenced in their scale free construct. The second 
implication is that for national defense to be effective, we need to strive for the 
same connectivity that our enemies exploit. To do this we must first share 
information. To achieve this goal, information sharing will form the links that 
connect disparate organizations and is critical to the formation of networks.  
2. Information Sharing Environment 
Congress and President mandated the Information Sharing Environment 
(ISE) through section 1016 of the IRTPA. This section directed the facilitation of 
sharing information of value to combat terrorism. The ISE strategy for 
accomplishing this goal is grounded in existing systems and technologies, rather 
than the creation of a new domestic intelligence regime. The alignment and 
leveraging of existing policies, processes, technologies, and systems will 
potentially lead to a culture of collaboration.100 The culture of collaboration 
envisioned by the ISE has many characteristics of a network. It will be resilient, 
sustainable, and adaptable. These traits will be important to support the five 
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communities the ISE serves: intelligence, law enforcement, defense, homeland 
security, and foreign affairs. The vision statement of the ISE is to develop: 
A trusted partnership among all levels of government in the United 
States, the private sector, and our foreign partners, in order to 
detect, prevent, disrupt, preempt, and mitigate the effects of 
terrorism against the territory, people, and interests of the United 
States by the effective and efficient sharing of terrorism and 
homeland security information.101 
The ISE vision recommends specific responsibilities on the part of all 
stakeholders. There are four roles that are specific to SLTP stakeholders: 
fostering a culture of fusion, maintaining situational awareness, protecting critical 
infrastructure, and developing terrorism specific training. Each of these areas is 
to be addressed with the help and consultation of federal partners. 
The culture of fusion enumerated in the ISE refers to fusing of crimes data 
with data affecting national security. ISE is not bound by a single federal agency 
or component; it is a broad-based coordination and collaboration effort among 
various stakeholders. 102 Thus, fusion will have to be a collaborative process that 
has input about crime from STLP partners and national security data from federal 
partners. Determining what applies to each specific jurisdiction and the nation will 
require the integration of SLTP stakeholders into the intelligence cycle as equal 
partners. Integration requires inputs and a place, physical or virtual, for the 
intelligence cycle to manifest itself. The inputs will come from the techniques of 
ILP, and a place for these goals to be accomplished will come from an integrated 
national network of fusion centers.103 Fusion at the national level is already 
occurring at the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC), and their analysis is 
being disseminated via the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination 
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Group. Research suggests that dissemination is occurring to some extent. AHSB 
personnel reported getting intelligence products from a number of sources 
including the ITACG. The main issue of concern from their standpoint was 
applicability at the local level. This suggests that a local model can be extended 
to SLTP as the common ground that will lead to Intelligence Proliferation.  
B. INTELLIGENCE LED POLICING 
1. Background 
Intelligence Led Policing is different from traditional law enforcement in 
that it attempts to prevent crime, not solve and prosecute after the fact. This 
methodology of crime prevention has been used to some extent in community 
oriented policing endeavors. Community Oriented Policing (COP) builds rapport 
with local communities by developing a continuity of relationships that focuses on 
specific needs. The ongoing positive interaction with police builds trust and turns 
a formerly adversarial relationship into one characterized by fruitful interaction. 
This leads to increased situational awareness and a keen sense of impending 
problems or anomalies with in the community.  There is collaboration between 
the local community and law enforcement that leads to lower crime and higher 
satisfaction. ILP is the next logical link in the chain after COP. Community 
oriented policing seeks to act locally, while the concept of ILP embraces the 
broader problems of multi-jurisdictional crimes and terrorism. Integration of 
formal intelligence functions into police work serves two purposes. The first is 
tactical; appropriate intelligence products can be used to prevent crimes such as 
terrorism and identify the protection needs of critical infrastructure. To a lesser 
extent, it can also be used to solve crimes and prosecute offenders, but this is 
the traditional role of the police and doesn’t represent a radical departure from 
the norm. The second role of ILP is strategic. The situational awareness 
characteristic of a functioning intelligence apparatus can lead to a proactive, 
targeted application of increasingly dwindling resources. The processing of 
information into the intelligence products that define the value of ILP occurs 
 62
through integration into the intelligence cycle. The value of integration into this 
cycle is recognized in the various programs discussed in this thesis and is 
supported by the research conducted with stakeholders in Anaheim California. 
2. Benefits 
The design and implementation of ILP is complicated, but the benefits are 
simple and profound. The police become a link between the local communities 
and the intelligence apparatus. The officers grow to be a two-way conduit for 
threat information between the local community and the intelligence apparatus. 
The situational awareness that comes from the intelligence apparatus can be 
fused with what is happening on the streets in order to identify possible precursor 
crimes or impending terrorist activity. The informed officers can put information 
into context on the streets, while the information gathered by those officers can 
help higher levels of government put local events into context at their level. The 
omni-directional flow of information that ILP generates facilitates Intelligence 
Proliferation and ultimately national defense. 
3. Barriers 
ILP is the exploratory collection of information needed to feed local and 
regional intelligence cycles while being sensitive to the perceptions and civil 
rights of the communities in which they work. The American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) takes issue with the fusion of law enforcement activities and domestic 
intelligence. A December 2007 report by the ACLU stated that: 
There is a long, nasty history of abuse surrounding vaguely 
defined, proactive “intelligence” as carried out by domestic law 
enforcement agencies at the local, state and federal level…Urban 
police have long maintained political intelligence units, which spied 
upon and sabotaged numerous peaceful groups in utterly illegal 
ways.104 
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A specific area of concern is the disposition of collected data. There is the 
fear that data, once collected, will be kept, even if no crime has been committed. 
This could very well lead giant databases that could be “mined” to the detriment 
of the law-abiding public. This and other civil liberty concerns will have to be 
addressed for effective implementation. Failure to do so will result in a loss of 
trust between law enforcement the communities they are charged to serve.  
A larger issue, at least from a practical standpoint, is the funding and 
training requirements generated by the addition of an intelligence function. 
Surveys and interviews conducted pursuant to this thesis indicate a high degree 
of dissatisfaction with the funding and training support available to local entities. 
The Miller survey data shows that 78% of the respondents felt resources were 
inadequate and 74% reported the same deficiencies in training.105 To be 
sustainable, ILP must have the buy in of those who control budgets. To do so will 
require demonstration of results and the nexus between local conditions and 
national security. 
Nested in the budget issue is analysis. Most departments cannot afford to 
hire their own intelligence analysts. This makes them dependent on products and 
information developed by outside agencies. The content of proper intelligence 
products is often of limited use owing to a lack of locally targeted context. Often 
times it is only a deluge of non-specific information. The Anaheim Homeland 
Defense Battalion relies primarily on the OCIAC for their products to mitigate this 
phenomenon.106 The IACP Intelligence Sharing Report cites the need to address 
analysis as the chief barrier to implementing ILP.  The IACP says we must find 
ways to: 
                                            
105  Miller, How can we Improve Information Sharing among Local Law Enforcement 
Agencies?, 43-45. 
106  Personal interview by author, September 23, 2008. 
 64
…Place a higher value on true analysis, support analyst positions 
and provide the opportunity for analysts to effectively engage in the 
intelligence mission.107 
A final barrier to the implementation of ILP is the disaggregation of 
systems designed to support the intelligence cycle. In order for information 
sharing to lead to Intelligence Proliferation, the technical enablers must share 
compatibility. It will do no good to overcome cultural and structural issues only to 
have our desire to communicate hampered by a “Tower of Babel” exchange 
structure. 
ILP is essentially the adoption of the intelligence cycle for SLTP 
stakeholders. This definition suggests points of entry for the DHS to act as 
facilitators in the implementation process. The DHS must be prepared to act as 
liaisons between the SLTP stakeholders and the IC. The inclusion of 
stakeholders into the intelligence cycle will be particularly important in the areas 
of requirements generation and feedback. A major contribution of the DHS is 
funding. There must be a critical review of grant policies and procedures to 
ensure the distribution of funds meets the needs of SLTP entities and the intent 
of national defense. At issue is the continuity of funds. It does no good to 
predicate a large portion of the national defense on the participation of SLTP 
stakeholders, and then cut off the funds that sustain them.  SLTP stakeholders 
should not receive a free ride. They will need to adopt an all hazards strategy 
that justifies the expense of programs beyond terrorism. This is why ILP is 
important, it makes local communities safer and bolsters national defense. The 
Global War on Terror has been described as “The Long War”.  The DHS should 
be prepared to fund SLTP stakeholders until either local fiscal support is secure 
or the long war is won. 
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C. FUSION CENTERS 
1. Background 
The strength of American law enforcement lies in its decentralized nature. 
The specialization and local knowledge enjoyed by individual jurisdictions, with 
their own tailored way of doing business, far exceeds any level of excellence that 
could be achieved with a single national structure. When other first responders 
and private sector entities are leveraged, the pervasive nature of the resultant 
structure forms the safety net that allows local communities to function. 
Unfortunately in the post 9-11 globalized world, this local focus and sheer 
number of agencies inhibits the integration needed to combat asymmetrical 
threats. The primary reason that decentralization has become a weakness is that 
local communities are very integrated, but that’s where it stops. The IC and its 
SLTP partners are a collection of agencies, not a system. The 9-11 commission 
report cited a further disparity in the nations intelligence function, that of the 
divide between domestic and foreign intelligence: 
Foreign intelligence agencies were watching overseas, alert to 
threats from foreign interests there. The domestic agencies were 
waiting for evidence of a domestic threat from sleeper cells within 
the United States.108 
The divide in intelligence roles caused a simple but profound effect on the 
outcomes of 9-11. The only people with a chance to interact with the bombers 
were STLP stakeholders, but no one told them who or what to look for. The 
responsibility for failure doesn’t lie with any individual or organization, but rather 
with the system as a whole. A fusion center can be the lens that focuses 
disparate organizations into a cohesive system in order to avoid a repetition of 
this past failure. 
Intelligence functions are not new to law enforcement. Metropolitan areas 
have had intelligence units for many years. The fusion center concept has grown 
                                            
108  Thomas Kean and others, 9-11 Commission Final Report,[2004]) (accessed 8/20/2008). 
263. 
 66
dramatically since 9-11. A perceived lack of intelligence support from the federal 
government led many states to stand up their own intelligence structures. The 
federal government has come to see the value of SLTP fusion centers and has 
taken steps to leverage these organizations for the mutual good of all involved. 
Local law enforcement and other stakeholders have been enlisted to become the 
eyes and ears of communities in the war on terror. With the proper training and 
support, local communities can be the vital link that sustains the nation in a time 
of war. The appropriate venue for this training and support is the “Fusion Center.” 
A fusion center is defined as a collaborative effort of two or more 
agencies that provide resources, expertise, and/or information to 
the center with the goal of maximizing the ability to detect, prevent, 
apprehend, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity.109 
2. Benefits 
The benefit of fusion center lies in the simple premise that the more 
information is shared, the more potential intelligence is developed. Because this 
is true, intelligence development becomes self-sustaining through this virtuous 
circle. The fusion center becomes the focal point for omni-directional information 
flow, bolsters the intelligence cycle for all stakeholders, and leads to intelligence 
proliferation. The DHS sees four discrete of benefits arising from fusion centers. 
These benefits are applicable to all stakeholders participating in the fusion 
process. 
• Clearly defined information gathering requirements 
• Improved intelligence analysis and production capabilities 
• Improved information and intelligence sharing 
• Improved prevention, protection, response and recovery 
capabilities110 
Additionally there are benefits that apply primarily to the DHS, and others that are 
most applicable to state and local stakeholders.  
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Benefits to DHS 
• Improved situational awareness 
• Improved access to local officials 
• Access to non-traditional sources 
• Improved informational flow from the SLTP to DHS 
Benefits to Stakeholders 
• Clearly defined DHS entry point 
• Insight into federal priorities 
• Participation in threat dialogue 
• Increased onsite intelligence expertise 
• Improved information flow from DHS111 
The OCIAC is functional example of a local fusion center that meets some of 
these criteria, but falls short of complete integration. 
3. Barriers 
Fusion center success is predicated on the inclusion of all stakeholders. 
The need for an all hazards approach to demonstrate viability and secure 
continuity of funding calls for the inclusion of stakeholders across all levels of 
government, first responders and appropriate members of the private sector 
(particularly owner operators of critical infrastructure). Who these stakeholders 
are will vary from location to location. While there will be a preponderance of law 
enforcement personnel in the fusion centers, as most centers are evolutions of 
existing law enforcement intelligence organizations, a sustainable fusion center is 
not a law enforcement fusion center.  
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has published several 
extensive reports on fusion centers. The most recent one, published in January 
2008, suggests that underlying philosophy is an issue and the current guidelines 
do little to mitigate this issue. The guidelines have the following limitations: (1) 
they are voluntary (2) the philosophy outlined in them is generic and does not 
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translate theory into practice, and (3) they are oriented to the mechanics of fusion 
center establishment.112It has been suggested that fusion centers have perhaps 
developed too quickly with disregard for the underlying discipline of intelligence 
fusion.113 For fusion to occur and the center to become more than window-
dressing, real transformation must occur at the organizational level. All of the 
stakeholders need to agree on a common philosophy of proactive approaches to 
terrorism and crime, responsibility for security, and environmental understanding 
to discern threats.114  The question becomes one of benefits. This is defined by 
who is included and should therefore pay the tab.  
The costs of fusion centers are a major concern, and where those costs 
are borne is a particularly salient issue. The support of the DHS to state run 
centers consists primarily of financial assistance through grant programs that 
totaled almost $240m in FY08115. The longevity of this funding cannot be 
counted on; so the value of fusion centers will again have to be proven through 
an all hazards/all stakeholders approach. 
A possible barrier to the sustainability of fusion centers is time. If there are 
no major terrorist attacks in the next decade or so, fusion centers that dedicate 
themselves to counter terrorism will have outlived their usefulness. The 
perceived lack of need will eventually outweigh the costs, and finances will be 
redirected. Since we all agree that terrorism is anathema to polite society, 
catastrophic events to justify the existence of a center are not desirable. Fusion 
centers will indeed have to become all hazards organizations. They will need to 
embrace natural and man-made disasters, as well as crime, to prove their worth 
as the memories of 9-11 fade.  
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Fusion centers must ensure the privacy of our citizens. The ACLU has 
published a document that identifies some characteristics of fusion centers as 
potential civil liberties pitfalls. They believe that fusion across all levels of 
government leads to “policy shopping” or the use of whichever policy is less 
restrictive in a multi jurisdictional environment.116 Although this flexibility can be 
problematic, adherence to the provisions of Title 28 of the CFR part 23117 
mitigate this concern. The inclusion of private sector partners and first 
responders, such as emergency medical technicians, also raises privacy 
concerns. There is the fear that information gathered by these entities in the 
course of their day-to-day duties could be stored and data mined. The ACLU 
premise that intelligence gathered in the absence of criminal predicate is unlawful 
resonates within the IC and SLTP stakeholders. DNI, Mike McConnell has 
wrestled with this issue and stated the following: 
The intelligence community has an obligation to better identify and 
counter threats to Americans while still safeguarding their privacy. 
But the task is inherently a difficult one.118 
Fusion centers will have to be especially diligent to avoid losing the criminal 
predicate when handling sensitive personal data. Furthermore, they must make 
sure that new STLP partners have the training necessary to avoid civil rights 
violations and possible litigation. 
The DHS must take the lead to break down the barriers to fusion center 
success and act as a liaison and facilitator for SLTP stakeholders. In order to do 
this there must both a monetary and physical presence. The DHS has addressed 
this by committing both personnel and resources to fusion centers. As of March 
2008, there were 58 operational intelligence fusion centers in the United States 
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receiving some sort of intelligence support from the DHS.119 This evolved 
somewhat of late with the fielding of DHS personnel to limited sites. As of March 
2008, there were 23 intelligence officers assigned to fusion centers with more in 
the pipeline.120  These officers will act as the liaisons to facilitate the intelligence 
cycle.  Furthermore, the DHS needs develop a common lexicon and training 
standards so that a network of fusion centers can interact across lines. There has 
to an arbiter amongst the agencies involved in the centers. As a relatively new 
entity the DHS must act as an honest broker to facilitate trust among the 
participants. 
D. SUMMARY 
If intelligence proliferation is to be achieved, the way forward is to 
construct a national intelligence regime that embraces the omni-directional 
sharing of information as prescribed by the Information Sharing Environment. 
• Implementation strategies must focus on areas of overlap. The 
solution space defined by this overlap transitions the sharing of 
information from a negative to positive sum game. 
• This regime will be networked as opposed to stove-piped. A 
network structure is necessary to practice counter terrorism at the 
“micro” level. 
• Fusion center success is predicated on the inclusion of all 
appropriate stakeholders. The inclusive nature will facilitate an all 
hazards approach that will demonstrate value and facilitate 
continuity of funding. 
• The fusion centers will act as the place where the information 
generated by Intelligence Led Policing enters the intelligence cycle 
and acts as the feedback loop for the dissemination and 
modification of the resultant intelligence. 
• ILP is not the exclusive purview of law enforcement. It is a 
technique for the leveraging of all SLTP stakeholders. 
 
 
                                            
119  DHS, State and Local Fusion Centers. 
120 DHS, State and Local Fusion Centers. 
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• Funding and civil liberties concerns will have to be addressed if 
fusion centers are going to be sustainable. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL THOUGHTS 
This thesis has shown that the need to proliferate intelligence to all 
appropriate levels of society is an imperative that was all too vividly illustrated by 
the attacks of 9-11. Terrorism cuts across all levels of society through loss of life, 
economic chaos, and the inhibition of freedoms. The horrific loss of life cannot be 
minimized or discounted, but the damage goes further, and its effects are 
enduring. Estimates of the future economic impact of terrorism, based on 9-11 
losses, range from 100 million to 100 billion dollars per year.121 These numbers 
don’t quantify the emotional toll or the self-imposed loss of personal freedom that 
attacks the very nature of democracy. The prolific nature of terror calls for an 
equally prolific response. This thesis has argued that in order to best leverage 
intelligence support for SLTP stakeholders, all aspects of the intelligence 
enterprise must leveraged to form a collaborative intelligence community that 
includes federal, state, and local law enforcement as well as private sector 
partners.  The policies and programs examined identify information sharing as 
the chief enabler of leverage. The premise is that the more information is shared 
the more intelligence is produced. This positive relationship drives the concept of 
intelligence proliferation. 
The first part of the thesis gave a summary of the IC, how it works, and 
some of the challenges it faces when leveraging its assets to bolster the 
capabilities of SLTP stakeholders. The idea of Intelligence Proliferation was 
introduced, as a label to identify what success will look like. IP should not be 
taken to suggest unfettered access to intelligence. The concept is that those at 
the STLP level, who have been properly vetted, will become integrated and equal 
partners in National Defense.  
                                            
121  Gregory F. Treverton, "Reorganizing U.S. Domestic Intelligence: Assessing the Options," 
Rand Corporation, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG767/ (accessed 11/11/2008). 
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 In order to frame the problem at the SLTP level, this thesis explored the 
attitudes of police chiefs and sheriffs in the state of California. A survey of 243 
law enforcement executives, conducted by Chief Pat Miller of the Ventura, CA 
police department, as well as the specific experiences of the Anaheim California 
Homeland Security Battalion served as the case studies.  The Miller data and the 
situation in Anaheim suggest that the attitudes of stakeholders are generally 
favorable with regards to the cost benefit analysis of participation in information 
sharing. There are several roadblocks that must be addressed in order to 
integrate SLTP stakeholders with the federal government and achieve 
Intelligence Proliferation. The overriding concerns identified by this thesis 
research include the following: 
• There is perceived lack of resources. Resources take the form of funding, 
equipment and discoverability of data and programs to support intelligence 
integration. 
• Cultural barriers impede the free flow of information. 
• Implementation of any policy will have to overcome cultural barriers and 
build an environment of trust. 
• Security clearance issues, particularly reciprocity, inhibit information 
exchange. This barrier is more cultural than statutory and needs to be 
addressed by strong leadership. 
• The value of the intelligence cycle is recognized, but not utilized to its full 
potential. The embracing of intelligence policing techniques across all 
levels will sustain a strong start for the fusion concept. 
• There is a universally recognized need for fusion of information at all 
levels of government. The appropriate venue for the aggregation of 
information and resources is the fusion center. 
• Collaboration implies a flow of information across all axes. The best 
facilitator of this flow is the movement to a networked organizational 
structure. 
• The exploratory nature of Intelligence Led Policing makes it the construct 
for information gathering that shows the most promise for exploiting the 
nexus of crime, terrorism and national defense. 
First responders, whether police, fire, or rescue, are invaluable sources of 
terrorism information and mitigation. By including state, local, and private sector 
parties in national defense, you empower them to be part of something bigger. 
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After 9-11 everyone wanted to do something, but there was a lack of focus. 
Inclusion of locals will build trust and rapport and help channel locally available 
resources. In the case of national defense, that resource is over 700,000 local 
police officers. They must be supported through the leveraging of all assets of 
national power, especially timely, locally targeted, and actionable intelligence. I 
believe that these common themes are addressed through ILP and fusion 
centers. ILP will gather the information, and fusion centers will act as the conduit 
between SLTP and the IC in order to facilitate intelligence proliferation and 
national defense.  
Intelligence proliferation represents an innovation in the way information is 
converted to intelligence and is consumed to bolster national defense. The key 
lies in the implementation or “how to” stage of the process. The implementation 
stage of innovation is dangerous, because any paradigm shifting idea will result 
in the destruction of some part of the status quo. This destruction threatens 
stakeholders in the old regimes. These stakeholders must either buy into the plan 
or be marginalized for the plan to go into action and result in innovation.  
Intelligence proliferation aims to become the new status quo.  If we can 
implement truly omni-directional information sharing across all levels of 
government, then the output should be a robust intelligence capability that is 
positioned to detect, deter, and prevent future terrorist activity. All implementation 
strategies must result in this output, the nature of the implementation will define 
the outcomes.  
Information is power. Intelligence takes informational power and multiplies 
it, increasing its power by orders of magnitude. The proliferation of intelligence is 
the proliferation of power, and it is this power that will be at the core of national 
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